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ARTICLE
THE INVISIBLE HAND OF PREACQUIRED
ACCOUNT MARKETING
PRENTISS COX*
Preacquired account marketing is a sales practice that allows companies to
charge consumers for services they do not know they ordered and do not use.
The practice depends on a seller's ability to access a consumer's financial ac-
count without the consumer directly providing her account number and other
access information to that seller. This flips the power dynamic in the solicitation
process by shifting the burden to the consumer to stop the seller from accessing
her account, rather than requiring the seller to ask the consumer for her account
information before her account can be charged. This is possible because the
seller has paid a financial institution, such as a bank, or another seller who
retains consumer account numbers for the right to charge the consumer's ac-
count. Tens of millions of consumers have been affected by this sales practice.
Many of these consumers have diminished mental capacity or struggle with the
English language, making it more likely that they will not understand that they
are being charged. This Article recommends that state legislatures or the United
States Congress adopt the proposed Uniform Consumer Account Control Act, a
total ban on preacquired account marketing. Prohibiting this form of marketing
is conceptually less difficult than many other areas of consumer protection regu-
lation because the regulatory costs in this situation are almost non-existent. A
total ban forces sellers to actually reach an understanding with consumers. Ex-
perience has shown that lesser remedies, such as improved disclosures, are in-
sufficient to control rampant consumer misunderstanding. They do not solve the
fundamental problem of shifting control of account access from the consumer to
the seller in a way that facilitates sorting of consumers into those unaware of
account charges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Preacquired account marketing ("preacquired marketing" or "preac-
quired account marketing") is a sales practice that allows companies to
charge consumers for services they do not know they ordered and do not
use. The practice depends on a seller's ability to access a consumer's finan-
cial account without the consumer directly providing her account number to
that seller. This is possible because the seller has paid either a financial insti-
tution, such as a bank, or another seller that retains consumer account num-
bers for the right to charge the consumer's account. This process provides
* Professor of Clinical Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. While an Assistant
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author was involved in many of the state attorney general enforcement actions, investigations,
and rule comments discussed herein. The author thanks Research Assistants Laura Arneson
and Kara Bovee for making this Article possible and thanks Dan Schwarcz, Claire Hill, Brett
McDonnell, and Kristin Hickman for their advice. The author also thanks the editors and staff
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preacquired account marketers with preferential access to consumer
accounts.
An overwhelming majority of consumers paying for services sold
through preacquired account marketing are unaware their accounts have
been charged, and thus are unaware they have "purchased" the service.'
Preacquired marketing works only because it singles out consumers who do
not understand the terms of the solicitation or consumers who become con-
fused about the "free trial offer" terms that are a critical component of the
practice.2 Many of these consumers have diminished mental capacity or
struggle with the English language, making it more likely that they will not
understand that they are being charged.' Data from public enforcement ac-
tions and investigations demonstrate that this result occurs in all forms of
preacquired account marketing. 4
The number of consumers targeted by this questionable practice is in
the tens of millions.' Many of the nation's largest financial institutions, in-
cluding JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of America, are substantially
involved in preacquired account marketing.6
Part II of this Article explains how preacquired account marketing
works. The practice is used primarily in conjunction with the mass market-
ing of membership clubs, insurance policies, and other services. The issuers
of consumer financial accounts, especially financial institutions that offer
credit cards and checking accounts, contract with these sellers to allow the
sellers to charge their customers' accounts. Alternatively, merchants, such as
Orbitz7 or Staples8, sell their customers' account information to preacquired
account marketers. Once sellers obtain the authority to charge consumer ac-
counts, they use all forms of direct marketing to solicit these consumers,
including direct mail, Internet marketing, and telephone calls.
Part III explores how this form of marketing causes consumer misun-
derstanding. Preacquired marketing flips the power dynamic in the solicita-
tion process by shifting the burden to the consumer to stop the seller from
accessing her account, rather than requiring the seller to ask the consumer
for her account information before her account can be charged. A consumer
normally provides her account number only after becoming assured that she
understands the transaction. Preacquired marketing bypasses this gate-keep-
'See infra Part III.C & D.
2 See infra Part 11I.B & C.
I See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
'See infra Part HI.D.1.
See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
'OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS MAJORITY STAFF, STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANsP., 11 TH CONG., AGGRESSIVE SALES TACTICS ON THE INTERNET AND
THEIR IMPACT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS 13 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter COMMITTEE
REPORT].
' Affinion Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 2008
Affinion 10-K].
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ing by the consumer. Part III catalogs the substantial evidence that preac-
quired marketing results in charges to millions of consumers who do not
know that their accounts have been charged.
Part IV examines two efforts by the federal government to restrict
preacquired account marketing. The first effort was part of the Gramm
Leach Bliley Act ("GLBA"), which enacted privacy protections as part of
the 1999 deregulation of the financial services industry.9 A seeming total ban
on preacquired marketing in the GLBA was turned into a sanction of the
practice by regulations promulgated by federal agencies implementing the
Act. 10 A more successful, but very limited, regulation was promulgated by
the Federal Trade Commission in its 2002 amendments to the Telemarketing
Sales Rule." Part IV also looks at the limits on market-based and litigation
responses to the problem.
Part V proposes the adoption of a Uniform Consumer Account Control
Act ("UCACA"). 12 The UCACA proposes a total ban on preacquired ac-
count marketing. A total ban is the appropriate remedy for preventing ac-
count charges to the millions of consumers who pay for unwanted services
because of preacquired account marketing. The UCACA differentiates preac-
quired account marketing, in which the seller obtains the consumer's account
information from a third party, from seller-retained account marketing,
where the seller obtains account information from a consumer, and then that
same seller uses the information in a later transaction with the same con-
sumer. The UCACA limits the use of seller-retained account information
with trial offers.
Part V also explains the rationale for completely forbidding the use of
preacquired account marketing. Prohibiting this form of marketing is con-
ceptually less difficult than many other areas of consumer protection regula-
tion because the regulatory costs in this situation are almost non-existent. 13
There is little to no discernible benefit to consumers in allowing a seller
access to their accounts without the consumers providing their account infor-
mation. Any seller can avoid having to comply with the regulation simply by
acquiring the consumer's account information from the consumer, a task all
other types of sellers must accomplish. The real burden of this last step, of
course, is that the seller must actually reach an understanding with the con-
sumer that the consumer wants to pay for the merchandise.
' Gramm Leach Bliley Act ("GLBA"), Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. V, § 502(d), 113 Stat.
1437 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6802(d) (2006)).
o See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 40.12 (2009); see also infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text.
"See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(6) (2009); see also infra notes 208-22 and accompanying text.
12 See infra app. A. Appendix A is the proposed UCACA.
"3 See infra Part IV.A.
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II. PREACQUIRED ACCOUNT MARKETING SALES SCHEMES
This Part describes the basic types of preacquired account marketing
schemes and discusses the companies involved on both sides of the transac-
tion-those selling services to consumers and those selling preferential ac-
cess to consumer accounts. 14 The most commonly marketed item is a
membership club sold by offering a free trial period." This form of market-
ing permits a staggering number of charges to consumers' accounts.
A. Preacquired Account Marketing is Based on Third-Party
Authorization to Charge Consumer Accounts
A seller uses preacquired account marketing by obtaining preferential
access to charge a consumer's account from someone other than that con-
sumer. The two sources from which the seller can obtain this account access
are: (1) an account issuer, such as a financial institution; or (2) another seller
that previously acquired the account number. These two types of preacquired
marketing are described below.
1. Preacquired Account Marketing Through Account Issuers
Consumers hold a variety of accounts with financial institutions and
merchants. Most consumers have multiple credit accounts, including credit
cards, retailer charge cards, and mortgage loans. 6 Consumers also typically
have multiple asset accounts, such as checking or savings accounts.' 7 A
seller using preacquired marketing (the "preacquired seller") gains preferen-
tial access to these consumer accounts by entering into a contract with the
institution that issues these consumer accounts (the "account issuer"). The
contract permits the preacquired seller to charge a consumer's account based
on the preacquired seller's determination that the consumer has consented to
the purchase. 8 This consent allows the preacquired seller to access the funds
' This Article uses the word "service" for the products sold because the vast majority of
this marketing allows account charges for services, especially membership clubs and insur-
ance, although goods such as magazines are also charged through preacquired marketing. See
infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
"5 NATL Ass'N OF ATr'Ys GEN. ("NAAG"), COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF AT-
TORNEYS GENERAL IN THE MATTER OF: "TELEMARKETING REvIEw-CoMMENT FIC FILE No.
P994414" 10 (2000), available at http:/Iwww.ftc.gov/bcplrulemakingltsrlcomments/naag.pdf
[hereinafter NAAG COMMENTS I]. The author was substantially involved in the production of
this document, as well as all other NAAG submissions to the FTC on this subject, while an
Assistant Attorney General in the Minnesota Office of the Attorney General.
6 See Marilyn Lewis, 1 in 7 Americans Carry 10 or More Credit Cards, MSN MONEY,
Feb. 14, 2007, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/CreditCardSmarts/lln7Ameri-
cansCarries I0CreditCards.aspxGT I = 9113.
" Carol C. Bertaut & Martha Starr-McCluer, Household Porfolios in the United States, in
HOUSEHOLD PORTFOuOS 181, 181 (Luigi Guiso et al. eds., 2002).
" NAAG COMMENTS I, supra note 15, at 10-11.
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from the account without obtaining either an account number (usually in the
form of a credit or debit card) or a negotiable instrument (usually a check).' 9
The contracts between the preacquired seller and the account issuer typ-
ically require the preacquired seller to provide a form of proof that the con-
sumer actually consented to the purchase. The proof of consent varies with
the form of solicitation.20 For a telemarketing call, for example, the preac-
quired seller usually tape records the end of the call where the consumer
provides her birth date or similar information as alleged verification of au-
thority to charge the account.2 Upon receiving verification of the consumer's
consent from the seller, the account issuer charges the full amount to the
consumer's account, pays the seller a portion of the purchase price, and re-
tains for itself a portion of the funds as a fee. 2
Account charges for a typical consumer purchase, one not involving
preacquired marketing, can be graphed as follows:
) CConsumer's
Full Amount Bank
(() Consumer ProvidesAccount Information ( 2) Merchanut ClearsCharge
Merchant Merchant's
\ /Bank
The consumer deals solely with the merchant as to the merchandise and
solely with her financial institution as to the charge. The merchant deals
19 Id.2 0 NAAG, COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN Ta MArER
OF: TELEMARKETING REVIEW - COMMENT FTC FuiE No. R411001 30 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/O4/naag.pdf [hereinafter NAAG CoM-
MENTS II].
21 NAAG COMMENTS I, supra note 15, at 12 ("Preacquired account marketers rarely, if
ever, directly ask the consumer for authority to charge his or her account. Instead the
telemarketer asks the consumer a general question about whether or not she or he understands
the terms of the offer," including asking the consumer to verify her birth date or state mother's
maiden name.).
22 See, e.g., 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 6 ("[T]he marketing partner markets our
products and services to its customers, collects revenue from the customer and typically pays
us a monthly fee per participant."); Vertrue, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Sept. 12,
2006) [hereinafter Vertrue 10-K] ("We pay the partner either a royalty for initial and renewal
membership fees or a fee per marketing offer or per sale.... [W]e pay the vendors a fee based
on the number of members enrolled in the membership program or based on other agreed-upon
factors.").
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solely with the consumer as to the merchandise and solely with its own fi-
nancial institution to obtain its funds for the merchandise.
In contrast, the schematic of a transaction involving a preacquired mar-
keting contract between a seller and an account issuer may be graphed as
follows:
(4) Consumer Charged
Full Amount 
C n u e '] Consumer's
Bank
(2) Solicitation v,
(3) Preacquired eSeller
Initiates Account Charge
Preacquired
Seller(5) Preacquired Seller Paid
_ _ _ _ _ . ... _ _ _ . __(Minus Bank's Commission)
Unlike a typical consumer transaction, a preacquired account transac-
tion starts with an agreement between the preacquired seller and the con-
sumer's financial institution (or other account issuer), which allows the
preacquired seller to have preferential account access-in other words, to
"preacquire" this account access. Unlike a typical consumer purchase,
preacquired marketing necessarily involves an initial solicitation by the
seller. At no point does the consumer provide the seller with a check or
credit card to finalize a sale. Instead, the seller initiates an account charge
based on the authority it preacquired by signing a contract with the account
issuer.
An example of a preacquired marketing transaction could begin when
Girish receives a mail solicitation for a free trial in the Travel Now member-
ship club, which offers discounts on travel services. The solicitation appears
to Girish to be from his financial institution, Blue Bank, but the offer actu-
ally is from Travel Now, the preacquired seller that has a contract with Blue
Bank allowing it to solicit Blue Bank customers and initiate charges to a
Blue Bank customer's account if Travel Now determines that the customer
has consented to its offer. If Girish returns an acceptance of the free trial
offer, and fails to cancel during the trial period, Travel Now will initiate a
charge on Girish's Blue Bank account. Blue Bank then charges Girish for the
full amount of the membership club fee. Under its contract with Travel Now,
[Vol. 47
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Blue Bank retains a portion of the amount charged to Girish and pays the
remainder to Travel Now.23
2. Preacquired Account Marketing Through Referring Sellers
The second conduit for preacquired marketing occurs through contracts
between two sellers. Again, this type of arrangement begins with the preac-
quired seller entering into a contract to obtain special account access-in
this case, by contracting with a merchant (the "referring seller") that previ-
ously obtained account access information from the consumer during a prior
transaction. The referring seller gives the consumer's account information to
the preacquired seller and, of course, is paid a portion of any charge col-
lected from customers. Payments made to the referring seller for participat-
ing in this arrangement and selling the consumer's account number have
been called "bounties,' 24 and these payments may exceed half of the amount
obtained from consumers. 25
This type of preacquired marketing may be graphed as follows:
(4) Consumer Charged Full Amount
CConsumer's
Bank
(3) Preacquired Seller
Clears Charge 27
Through Its Bank
( rI(1) Contract for Transfer
of Consumer's Account
Access Information
(5) Preacquire Seller Pays
Referring Seller Commission
23 This hypothetical is based on allegations against Chase Bank. See Complaint for Injunc-
tion, Civil Penalties and Other Equitable Relief, People v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No.
GIC850483 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 12, 2005), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms05/05-
054_0a.pdf (describing agreements between Chase and Trilegiant, the corporate predecessor to
Affinion).
24 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 97.
25 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at ii (stating that payments to referring sellers partic-
ipating in Internet preacquired marketing were $792 million of $1.4 billion in revenue).
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For example, Girish rents a car and pays for the rental by providing his
credit card to 3Q Auto Rental ("3Q"), the referring seller. 3Q has a contract
with Travel Now, the preacquired seller, which allows Travel Now to solicit
3Q customers and to charge the accounts used by 3Q customers to pay for
their rental cars. Travel Now can use the customer and account information
provided by 3Q to solicit Girish to accept a free trial offer in the Travel Now
membership club, without Girish ever being asked to provide his account
information. If Girish accepts the free trial offer, and fails to cancel during
the trial period, Travel Now has access to the necessary account information
from 3Q to charge Girish's account. 3Q and Travel Now then split the pro-
ceeds from the account charge.16
B. Preacquired Sellers and Their Partners Providing Account Access
The product most commonly sold through preacquired marketing is a
membership club.27 For example, preacquired sellers market home decorat-
ing clubs that provide discounts on furniture" and programs to help prevent
identity theft.2 9 Preacquired sellers also often sell insurance policies30 and
magazine subscriptions."'
Preacquired sellers are affiliated with a wide range of account issuers
and referring sellers that can offer access to their customers' accounts. For
example, in 2009, Affinion Group, the largest seller of membership pro-
grams through preacquired marketing, reported, "Our diversified base of
marketing partners includes more than 5,500 companies in a wide variety of
industries, including financial services, retail, travel, telecommunications,
26 This hypothetical is based on allegations against Budget Rental Car. See app. B and
infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (describing sample Budget-Everyday Values
solicitation).
27 NAAG COMMENTS I, supra note 15, at 10.
28 See, e.g., Encore Marketing Home & Garden Savings Club, http://www.encoremarket-
ing.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (follow links to "Our Programs", then "Membership
Clubs", and then "Home & Garden Savings Club"); Provell Essentials for Home, http://www.
provell.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (follow links to "our programs", then "Essentials for
Home").
29 See, e.g., Affinion Group, Privacy Guard, http://www.affiniongroup.comlproducts-ser-
vices/membership/pivacy-guard.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Affinion Group, ID Secure,
http://www.affiniongroup.com/products-services/membership/idsecure.cfm (last visited Mar.
23, 2010); Identity Guard, http://www.identityguard.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Vertrue,
Consumer Programs - Security, http://www.vertrue.comlconsumer-prog-security.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2010).
o NAAG COMMENTS II, supra note 20, at 30-38; see also 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note
8, at 9-10 ("We offer four primary insurance programs that pertain to supplemental health or
life insurance.); Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 4 (describing insurance programs as including
"life, supplemental health, accidental death, short-term and long-term disability").
" Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection: Hearing on the Growing Concerns over
the Way Consumers' Personal and Financial Information Is Being Shared or Sold by Their
Financial Institutions Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 4-7 (2002) (statement of William H. Sorrell, Att'y Gen., The State of Vermont); NAAG
COMMENTS 11, supra note 20, at 30-38.
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utilities and Internet. Select marketing partners include Bank of America,
JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Socidt6 Grnrale, Choice Hotels, Staples, 1-800-
FLOWERS and Priceline. ' '32 Another large preacquired seller, Vertrue, Inc.,
stated in 2006, "Our membership programs are marketed, in many cases,
through arrangements with our clients, which include banks and other finan-
cial institutions, e-commerce companies, direct response television compa-
nies, catalog companies, retailers, and other organizations with large
numbers of individual customers. '33
Preacquired marketing agreements with account issuers authorize the
charge of credit accounts, such as credit cards or mortgage loans, and asset
accounts, such as checking or savings accounts. 34 The typical account issuer
is either a large financial institution or an operating subsidiary of the finan-
cial institution.3 For example, in 2008, Affinion reported that it had con-
tracts with "18 of the top 20 U.S. credit card issuers, 17 of the top 20 U.S.
debit card issuers, 5 of the top 5 U.S. mortgage companies and 13 of the top
20 European retail banks. '36 Another preacquired account membership club
seller, Intersections, Inc., described its largest clients in 2007 and 2008 as
Bank of America, Citibank, Discover, and Capital One.37 Preacquired mar-
keting with account issuers extends beyond financial institutions to include
any type of company that creates and maintains consumer accounts. Thus,
utility, cable, and telecommunication companies sell preferential account ac-
cess to preacquired sellers.38
A large number of consumers are solicited and charged for products,
membership clubs, insurance policies, or other merchandise through preac-
quired marketing. Affinion alone claims over seventy million worldwide
"members" in its consumer programs as a result of "over 800 million direct
mail marketing pieces mailed annually," "80 million telemarketing contacts
annually," and "over 1 million new online members added each year. 39
Vertrue more modestly claimed "approximately 5.8 million" members in
2006. 40
32 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 12. Affinion's largest "marketing partner" is
JPMorgan Chase, which accounted for more than ten percent of its revenue. Id.
33 See Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 5.
See id.
31 See Affinion Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 29, 2008).
36 Id.
37 Intersections, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6, 35 (Mar. 16, 2009).
3' 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 4, 11 (noting that expansion into the "cable,
telecom and utilities industries" is a key element of its business strategy); see also, e.g., Post-
ing of Sam Glover to Caveat Emptor, http://caveatemptorblog.comlt-mobile-scamming-cus-
tomers (Jan. 7, 2010).
3" Affinion Group, The Value of Partnership, http://www.affinion.com/our-expertise/case-
studies/value_of-partnership.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
o Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 6; see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (not-
ing that Vertrue, Affinion, and Webloyalty claim that over thirty-four million members were
promised incentive payments).
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C. Solicitation Methods
Preacquired marketing occurs through a variety of solicitation methods,
including direct mail, Internet sales, and telemarketing. The following dis-
cussion describes the mechanics of these different methods in more detail.
1. Direct Mail
Direct mail solicitations occur in many forms, such as stand-alone so-
licitation letters, inserts in credit card or other bills, and detachable forms on
the envelope of statements.41 One popular format for direct mail is a "live
check" sent to the consumer. The back of the check contains a statement that
the consumer agrees to join a membership club or program and authorizes
charges to her account if she fails to cancel within a set time period.42 In
2009, Affinion reported that direct mail "remains [its] largest marketing
medium in terms of new member acquisition, accounting for 45% of new
joins globally in 2008.143
2. Internet "Post-Transaction" Preacquired Marketing
Internet sales are a growing market for preacquired account sellers.44
After a consumer shopping on the Internet clicks the button to accept the
purchase, she sees a screen that presents the solicitation membership club
offered by the preacquired seller.45 Sometimes this offer is presented in a
pop-up box, but other times the consumer is directed to a new webpage
where she is compelled to hit a button accepting or rejecting the solicitation
in order to reach the confirmation page for the intended purchase. 46 These
types of Internet solicitations by the preacquired seller have become known
4' 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 7 ("Our direct mail operations incorporate a vari-
ety of mailing types, including solo direct mail, detachable inserts, credit card inserts, state-
ment inserts, promotion inserts, and other printed media.").
42 See infra app. B; see also, e.g., Herb Weisbaum, Don't Cash that Check! It's a Scam,
MSNBC, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15104735/ns/business-consumer_
news/.
" 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 7.
44 Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 5-6. Affinion projected a "compound annual growth
rate of approximately 15.1% for Internet media from 2007 to 2012 in the [United States]."
2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 6.
41 CoMMiTTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-3; see also Aggressive Sales Tactics on the
Internet and Their Impact on American Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, I 11 th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Aggressive Sales Tactics
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.), Chairman, S. Comm. On Commerce,
Science, and Transportation), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=
HearingsandPressReleases&ContentRecordid= lab8d59f-73a4-4fd9-aa2a-611 c85861 f0c&
ContentType-id= 14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group-id=dcb92227-73d9-4ff2-
a610-9f43df72faa5. The author testified at this hearing. See id. (statement of Prentiss Cox,
Associate Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota Law School).
46 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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as "post-transaction marketing. '47 The transfer of the consumer's account
number from the referring seller to the preacquired seller has been referred
to as a "data pass" in the context of Internet preacquired marketing.48
In 2009, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.), Chairman of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (the "Com-
mittee" or "Senate Committee"), began an investigation into preacquired
marketing practices on the Internet.49 The Committee staff report that re-
sulted from the initial phase of this investigation revealed that "more than
450 e-commerce companies and e-retailers" have acted as referring sellers
with three of the largest preacquired sellers using Internet marketing-Affi-
nion, Vertrue, and Webloyalty.5 0 According to the Senate Committee Report,
these three preacquired sellers have charged consumers more than $1.4 bil-
lion for membership clubs sold through the Internet, with more than half of
that amount paid as "bounties" to the referring e-retailers.11
3. Telemarketing and the "UpseU1"
Telemarketing solicitations using preacquired account authority have
three distinct forms: (1) outbound telemarketing, (2) inbound telemarketing,
and (3) Voice Response Unit ("VRU") systems. Outbound telemarketing is
the familiar scenario in which a stranger calls a consumer's phone and at-
tempts to sell her an unsolicited good or service. 2 An inbound telemarketing
solicitation occurs when the consumer initiates a call to an account issuer or
referring seller. After the initial transaction prompting the consumer's call is
complete, the preacquired seller's product is presented to the consumer either
by the account issuer, the referring seller, or by transfer to the preacquired
seller.53
In 2006, Vertrue described its inbound telemarketing as targeting its
partners' inbound callers who meet certain criteria. 4 These callers are of-
fered "membership programs by the partner's service representative or by
one of [Vertrue's] membership service representatives through a call trans-
fer. '5 5 In return for access to the caller, Vertrue "pay[s] the partner either a
royalty . . . or a fee per marketing offer or per sale. '56 For instance, Leah
calls to order clothes from JCPenney and the representative agent asks Leah
if she would like ten dollars off her order and a thirty-day free trial member-
4 7 Id. at 1-3.
48 Id. at 2-5.
41 See generally id.50 Id. at 13.
51 Id. at 14. It appears from the context of the Committee Report that the $1.4 billion in
revenue was generated during the time frame of 1999 to 2009. Id.
52 See FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(u) (2009) (defining "Outbound
telephone call").
3 See NAAG COMMENTS II, supra note 20, at 33-34.
Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 5.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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ship in JCPenney Perfect Home Rewards. If the representative deems Leah
to have consented, the representative enrolls Leah in the rewards program.57
If Leah fails to cancel her membership within thirty days, the account she
used to pay for her clothes is charged for the club's monthly membership
fee. 58
VRUs, the ubiquitous computerized phone systems that require press-
ing numbers on the phone keypad to navigate through various menus, are
similarly employed in preacquired marketing. Preacquired sellers refer to
this type of solicitation as an "upsell,"5 9 although it functions similarly to
what is called "post-transaction" marketing in the Internet context. 6° Affi-
nion describes its VRU program as follows:
When a consumer contacts an affinity partner's call center to acti-
vate a credit or debit card, check their account balance or make
another inquiry that can be handled electronically, the automated
voice response system offers our product while the customer is
waiting for, or after the completion of, the transaction or inquiry. 6'
D. The Free Trial Offer
Regardless of the solicitation channel, a constant companion of preac-
quired marketing is the free trial offer with negative option. 62 A typical free
trial offer provides the consumer thirty days from enrollment to use the
membership club, but some free trial periods, such as for insurance pro-
grams, can extend up to one year.63 The free trial also contains a negative
option, meaning that the consumer is charged the full price of the member-
ship or service if she fails to cancel it within the trial period.64
" See JCPenney Perfect Home Rewards, How Did I Enroll in JCPenney Perfect Home
Rewards?, http://www.perfecthomerewards.com/help/how-did i enroll.php (last visited Mar.
23, 2010).
" See id.
59 NAAG COMMENTS II, supra note 20, at 33-34.
'See supra Part II.C.2.
61 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 7.
62 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(t) (2009) (defining "Negative option feature"); see also COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6; 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 34 ("Members are
usually offered incentives (e.g. free credit reports or other premiums) and one to three month
risk-free trial periods ...."); Vertrue 10-K, supra note 22, at 6 ("When consumers agree to
enroll in a program, they generally receive a trial membership."); NAAG COMMENTS 1, supra
note 20, at 32 ("A constant companion of the preacquired account telemarketer is the opt-out
free trial offer.").
63 See, e.g., Ruling as to Liability at 45, 54, 56, Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., Equity
No. EQ 53486 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.state.ia.us/
government/ag/latest news/releases/mar_20O0VertrueRULINGRuling.pdf ("typical" Ver-
true solicitation is a thirty-day free trial offer); see also, e.g., app. B (thirty-day trial).
4 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(t). Preacquired marketers also use negative options for automatic
renewal of the charges. See COMMIrTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. Also, the amount of the
charge may increase after the first year. See, e.g., app. B (annual fee of $119.99 increases to
$129.99 on automatic renewal in second year).
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Appendix B is an example preacquired account solicitation where ac-
count access is provided by a referring seller. This sample solicitation also
involves the combination of preacquired selling with a "live check," which
is a negotiable instrument that obligates the consumer to the solicitation
terms when cashed. The preacquired seller is Trilegiant (the company offer-
ing the "Everyday Values" club), and the referring seller is Budget, the car
rental company.65 The solicitation comes in an envelope with a Budget logo
and contains three check-size pieces of paper: a check for $9.25; a larger
print document with the Budget logo explaining the benefits of the offer; and
a smaller print and denser disclosure page. 66 The benefit of money back on
cash purchases is prominent in the solicitation. Conspicuously featured on
the large print page is the following statement: "Please accept the enclosed
check and use your $9.25 cash for whatever you wish. '67 In the middle of
the disclosure page is the following paragraph:
Your satisfaction and your relationship are always important.
When you cash or deposit the enclosed check, we will automati-
cally extend your membership for an additional eleven months fol-
lowing your thirty-day trial and bill the $119.99 annual fee to the
card you have on file with Budget for a membership in Everyday
Values unless you call 1-877-880-1825 to cancel during the thirty-
day trial period and owe nothing. Your trial period begins when
your membership materials arrive in four to five weeks. Everyday
Values is not affiliated with Budget. Your second-year member-
ship will be billed automatically at the $129.99 annual fee. Your
membership for each year thereafter will be billed at the then-cur-
rent fee, automatically billed annually to the same account unless
you call to cancel. We will not have to ask for your account num-
ber or further consent in order to bill you.6"
A similar statement appears above the endorsement line on the back of
the check.69 This is a typical free trial offer with negative option for a mem-
bership club sold by preacquired marketing.
65 Trilegiant is the corporate predecessor to Affinion, and both Trilegiant and Budget have
had or currently have connections to Cendant Corporation. 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8,
at 1, 6; see Martin Bosworth, Inside Trilegiant's Marketing Machine, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM,
July 21, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/trilegiantinside.html.
6 See app. B.
67/d.
6 Id.69 1d.
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III. CONSUMER UNAWARENESS OF PREACQUIRED
MARKETING ACCOUNT CHARGES
Astounding numbers of consumers are unaware that they are paying for
services "sold" through preacquired marketing.7" This is because preac-
quired sellers avoid obtaining the traditional cues used by consumers to sig-
nal consent to account charges. Instead, preacquired sellers rely on the
contractual authorization from the account issuer or the referring seller to
access the consumer's account. When combined with a "free trial offer,"
preacquired marketing leads to account charges for a substantial number of
consumers who are unaware that their accounts were charged. The result is a
marketing system that thrives solely because it results in account charges to
consumers who did not want to purchase the service.
A. Preacquired Marketing Generates Massive
Misunderstanding Among Consumers
A large number of consumers have complained to state attorneys gen-
eral, the Better Business Bureau ("BBB"), and other consumer advocates
that the preacquired account marketing practice is deceptive. 71 The BBB
alone has received thousands of complaints about Affinion Group.72 A BBB
spokesperson found that "[t]he large volume and pattern of complaints
BBB has received indicates that Affinion is not taking enough steps to en-
sure consumers understand exactly what they're getting into. '73 Vertrue, an-
other preacquired marketing company, has received an "F" rating from the
BBB because of the thousands of complaints filed against the company, and
its failure to resolve those complaints. 74
The companies themselves also receive large numbers of consumer
complaints. The Senate Committee investigation found that the companies
"receive millions of calls every year from angry, frustrated consumers" who
70 COMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at iii ("Internal documents reviewed by Committee
staff show that Affinion, Vertrue, and Webloyalty know that most of the 'members' they ac-
quire through their aggressive online sales tactics do not understand they have been enrolled in
a program that charges their credit or debit card on a recurring basis.").
71 COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2; see also, e.g., Petition in Equity at 14-16, Iowa
ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., Equity No. EQ 53486 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County May 15,
2006), available at http://www.state.ia.us/govemmentagllatest-news/releases/may-2006/
MemberWorksVertuePETITION_5_06.pdf (describing numerous complaints from
consumers).
72 Press Release, BBB, BBB Receives Thousands of Complaints on Mysterious Credit
Card Charges: U.S. Marketing Company Is Charging Online Shoppers Every Month Without
Their Knowledge (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.bbb.org/us/article/bbb-receives-
thousands-of-complaints-on-mysterious-credit-card-charges-us-marketing-company-is-charg-
ing-online-shoppers-every-month-without-their-knowledge-5798.
73 id.
' BBB, Company Reliability Report: Vertrue, Inc., http://www.bbb.org/nebraska/busi-
ness-reviews/advertising-direct-maillvertrue-in-omaha-ne-107000028 (last visited Mar. 23,
2010).
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have discovered their enrollment, and wish to cancel their membership or
challenge charges to their accounts. 75 Customers contacting the companies
"us[e] words like 'fraud,' 'tricked,' 'deceptive,' 'misleading,' 'scam,' 'deceit-
ful,' 'dishonest,' 'betrayed,' and 'robbed' to describe their experiences."76
Complaints at one referring seller rose to a level that an employee of the
company described as "brutal and unprecedented. 7
The large numbers of consumer complaints have led to consumer pro-
tection actions by public enforcement agencies. State attorneys general have
brought several lawsuits against some of the largest banks in the nation for
their roles in preacquired account marketing schemes.78 The first suit against
an account issuer was brought against U.S. Bancorp by thirty-nine state at-
torneys general.79 The suit alleged violations of federal and state laws for
U.S. Bancorp's sharing of bank account numbers and other personal finan-
cial data with preacquired sellers.80 State attorneys general also have brought
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices ("UDAP") actions against the fol-
lowing account issuers for participation in preacquired marketing: Bank One
(a multistate lawsuit involving twenty-nine states)8"; Fleet Mortgage;82 Ci-
tibank (a multistate lawsuit involving twenty-eight states); 83 Sears;4 and
Chase Manhattan.85 State attorneys general enforcement actions against re-
ferring sellers engaged in preacquired marketing include cases against Tick-
" CoMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 7, at iii.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 27.
78 See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
71 See Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Settlement With US Bank
Helps Protect Consumer Privacy (Sept. 22, 2000), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/
pressrelease.aspx?&id=4716.
80 Complaint at 11-16, Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 99-872 (D.
Minn. June 8, 1999) (on file with author).
"' See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Att'y Gen., First USA to Halt Vendors'
Deceptive Solicitations: Agreement Extends Protections to Cover Millions of Credit Card
Holders (Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2002/dec/
dec31a_02.html. FirstUSA is a subsidiary of Bank One Corporation. See Complaint, Leben-
sohn v. Bank One Corp., No. 99-CV-08120 (N.D. I11. Dec. 14, 1999), available at http://
securities.stanford.edu/101 3/ONE99/complaintO22500.htm.
82 Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2001);
Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Minn. 2001). The
author participated in all actions cited in this Article in which the Minnesota Attorney Gen-
eral's Office was involved.
83 Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Citibank (N.Y. Att'y Gen. Feb. 27, 2002), available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2002/feb/feb27b_02-attach.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Cal. Att'y Gen., Attorney General, District Attor-
neys Settle Consumer Protection Complaint Against Memberworks, Sears Over Discount Club
Memberships (Apr. 27, 2001), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/print-release.php?id=
1076.
" Complaint for Injunction, Civil Penalties and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 23; see
also Maria Aspan, Check Is in the Mail; Is Reputation on the Line?, AM. BANKER, March 14,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4932679. Following the settlement of this case, Chase reduced
its use of "live checks" in preacquired account marketing and switched to the use of gift cards
as an incentive to accept the free trial offer. See Maria Aspan, JPM Chase Drops Check Offers
in Favor of Plastic Variety, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 12131090.
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etmaster, Time,86 and, more recently, AT&T.87 The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") has also filed lawsuits against numerous referring
sellers engaging in preacquired marketing with Triad Discount Buying Ser-
vices.88 Companies involved in the FTC matter included the following: Pre-
mier Club Services, L.L.C.; Premier Marketing Services of America, L.L.C.;
Residents Resource Network, L.L.C.; and the Shoppers Edge, L.L.C., among
numerous others. 89
State attorneys general have repeatedly filed enforcement actions
against many preacquired sellers as well. These include cases against
Damark (now Provell, Inc.), 9° Blitz Media, Inc., 91 BrandDirect Marketing,
Inc. (a multistate lawsuit involving the Washington and Connecticut attor-
86 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Att'y Gen., Entertainment Giants Settle
Massive Telemarketing Case: Spitzer Settles Case Involving "Free" Trial Offers of Magazines
(Jan. 7, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2002/jan/jan07a_- 02.html.
17 See Assurance of Discontinuance, In re AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 09-2-00463-1 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/
PressReleases/2009/AT&T%20Asurion%20AOD2-26-09.pdf.
88 Stipulated Final Judgment and Order, FTC v. Smolev, No. 01-8922-CIV-ZLOCH (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/l0/triadsmolevorder.pdf; Com-
plaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Smolev, No. 01-8922-CIV-ZLOCH
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/200l/l0/triadsmolevcom-
plaint.pdf [hereinafter Smolev Complaint]. Twenty-nine states were also involved in the law-
suit. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4621 n.469 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (noting that twenty-nine states sued Triad Discount Buying
Services); see also Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Settlement of Claims
for Monetary Relief, FTC v. TechnoBrands, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-86 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2002)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/technobrandsstip.pdf; Complaint for Permanent In-
junction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. TechnoBrands, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-86 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/technobrandscmp.pdf; Press Re-
lease, Office of the Attorney Gen., Cornyn Gets Settlement in Hearing Aid Case, (Dec. 12,
2001), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/newsarchive/2001/20012ll 2techno.
htm (explaining that the Texas Attorney General's Office, along with attorneys general from
thirteen other states and the District of Columbia, settled claims against TechnoBrands, Inc.).
89 For an inclusive list of the companies named in the FTC's lawsuit, see Smolev Com-
plaint, supra note 88.
0 Assurance of Discontinuance, Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Damark Int'l, Inc., No. C8-99-
10638 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Ramsey County Dec. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
9' See ILL. ATT'y GEN.'S OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE IN THE MATrER OF: TELEMARKETING SALES RULE REVIEW .FTC FILE No.
R411001 1-2 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/sup-
plement/ilag%5B I %5D.pdf.
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neys general), 92 MemberWorks and its successor Vertrue, 93 and Trilegiant (a
multistate lawsuit involving sixteen states).94
B. Understanding Consumer Misunderstanding
These consumer complaints and enforcement actions underscore the se-
verity of the problem of consumer misunderstanding with preacquired mar-
keting. The starting point for examining the genesis of this misunderstanding
is looking at how preacquired marketing effectively transfers the control of
consent to an account charge from the consumer to the seller. This core
problem is then compounded by a layering of other sales tactics that have
long been associated with consumer deception and misunderstanding. The
end result of preacquired marketing is that many consumers never grasp the
terms of the transaction, while other consumers become confused between
the time of the initial solicitation and the account charge.
1. The Fundamental Issue: Preacquired Marketing Shifts the
Control of Consent to the Account Charge from the
Consumer to the Seller
Consumers use three shorthand methods of signaling consent to be
charged in a consumer transaction: cash; a signature on an account instru-
ment; or providing the seller an account number or other account access
information. Handing cash to a seller obviously constitutes agreement to
purchase a product or service. A signature signals consent to be charged
when that signature is affixed to account information controlled by the con-
sumer, such as negotiable instruments like a check.95
Providing an account number is increasingly the shorthand method of
choice in everyday consumer transactions. Consumers perform this task in
numerous ways, such as physically handing over their credit cards, swiping
92 Press Release, Office of the N.Y. Att'y Gen., Telemarketing Company Promises Re-
forms: Spitzer Reaches Settlement with Firm Using Bank Customer Information (Jan. 16,
2001), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media-center/2001/jan/janl6a_01.html; Press
Release, Wash. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Settlement with Discount Buying Club High-
lights Privacy Concerns (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?
&id=5010.
93 Multiple states initiated separate actions against Memberworks' successor entity, Ver-
true. See, e.g., Ruling as to Liability, supra note 63; Second Amended Complaint, Minnesota
ex rel. Hatch v. Memberworks, Inc., No. MC99-010056 (4th Dist. Minn. Apr. 17, 2000) (on
file with author); Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunctive Relief and Other Statutory
Relief, Florida ex rel. Crist v. Memberworks, Inc., No. 03-9797 (13th Jud. Cir. Ct. Fla. Oct.
2003), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/memberworks.pdf.
I See, e.g., [Proposed] Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment, People v. Trilegiant
Corp., No. GIC850483 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County Aug. 2006), available at http://ag.
ca.gov/cms.pdfs/press/2006-12-1 l _TrilegiantSettlementJudgment.pdf.
91 In contrast to written instruments that permit immediate payment, consumers also con-
sent to be obligated to make payments in the future through entering written contracts that do
not require immediate payment; for instance, when signing an auto loan.
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their cards in machines, reading account numbers over the phone, or entering
their account numbers on websites.
Preacquired marketing effectively circumvents these shorthand meth-
ods of consent. The preacquired seller can charge the consumer's account
when that seller determines the consumer consented rather than when the
consumer provides the shorthand consent that would otherwise be required
of the consumer to charge her account. This difference, in turn, flips the
normal dynamic of the solicitation process, and thus confuses consumers. A
survey by the American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") found
that many, if not most, consumers do not understand that their financial ac-
counts can be accessed if they do not provide their account numbers to the
seller in the context of a telemarketing transaction.96
In a preacquired marketing Internet transaction, for example, the con-
sumer enters her account data before the preacquired portion of the solicita-
tion occurs. Assume that a customer, Marisa, buys an airplane ticket online
by entering her account information on the airline's website. She is then
directed to a pop-up screen wanting to know if she is interested in "free" gas
coupons. She hits the link, and a new screen appears promising the free gas
coupons and discounts on other purchases if Marisa accepts a free thirty-day
trial in a membership club.
It is at this point in the solicitation process that preacquired marketing
takes a sharp turn from a typical consumer transaction. Marisa's acceptance
of the free trial obligates her to pay the membership fee after the thirty days
expires if she fails to affirmatively cancel the membership. The preacquired
seller of the membership club has already obtained the right to authorize
charges to Marisa's credit card from the referring seller, which, in this case,
is the airline selling her the ticket. If the membership club seller had to get
Marisa to enter her credit card information to obtain the "free" coupons, it is
likely that Marisa would ask herself why a "free" offer requires a credit
card. Instead, the membership club seller makes some form of disclosure
that it and the airline, through their contract, consider Marisa's online accept-
ance after "review" of the disclosure adequate to demonstrate her consent to
the later charge, if she fails to cancel within thirty days. The power dynamic
has thus shifted from Marisa controlling consent of when an account charge
occurs to the seller having control of that determination. This critical missing
step-the seller asking the consumer for a well-understood acknowledge-
ment of consent to an account charge-underlies the economic logic of
preacquired marketing.
96 VT. Ar'Y GEN.'s OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENT IN THE MATTER OF: ThLEMARKET-
iNG RUiLEMArKING FTC FILE No. R411001 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/com-
ments/dncpapercomments/supplement/vtag.pdf' A plurality-46%-of consumers thought that a
telemarketer could not charge a credit or debit card without obtaining the account number from
the consumer, while a majority-51%-did not think a bank account could be charged in this
manner. Id. at 2. Another 15% and 13%, respectively, did not know if this type of charge was
possible. Id.
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2. The Layering of Practices Susceptible to Misunderstanding
This potential for misunderstanding with preacquired marketing is com-
pounded substantially by its ubiquitous pairing with a "free trial offer,"
which has long been seen as susceptible to abuse in consumer transactions. 97
The use of the word "free," or "risk-free," and the concept that the solicita-
tion is only for a trial offer reduce the consumer's expected level of involve-
ment in the transaction.9 8 As a telemarketing script soliciting for a
membership club put it, "we're sending you the information through the
mail, so you don't have to make a decision on the phone." 99 Presenting the
solicitation as a low-involvement marketing decision for the consumer exac-
erbates the problem of consumer misunderstanding with this marketing sys-
tem. The consumer needs to be more vigilant in this type of solicitation, not
less engaged, because the consumer has been deprived of the ultimate con-
trol over charges to her account.
Preacquired marketing solicitations also blur the identity of the preac-
quired seller and the account issuer or referring seller, so the consumer be-
lieves that the solicitation is for a service provided by the account issuer or
referring seller. 1°° In the Budget-Trilegiant "live check" solicitation de-
scribed earlier, the envelope has a prominent logo for the referring seller,
Budget, in the return address and on the first page of the solicitation. 10 1 The
name "Budget" appears repeatedly throughout the solicitation. 2 But in the
middle of a paragraph on the smaller type page is a statement that seems to
contradict the overall impression of the solicitation: "Everyday Values is not
affiliated with Budget."'' 3 The name of Trilegiant, the actual preacquired
seller, appears only in footnote two on the back of this disclosure page. 1°4
The introduction of the offer as prominently associated with a trusted com-
pany, such as a business the consumer has already transacted with, further
reduces the consumer's sense of involvement in the transaction or wariness
to the deal. As Affinion states, "[our] direct marketing provides us with
access to our marketing partners' large customer base, generally results in
higher response rates as customers recognize and trust our marketing part-
" Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Advertising "Free Trial" of Merchandise As Decep-
tive Act or Practice or Unfair Method of Competition Violative of § 5(a)(1) of Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 45(a)(1)), 26 A.L.R. FED. 795 (1976); FTC, Trial Offers: The
Deal Is in the Details, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/prol6.shtm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010).
9 8 See Edmund Mierzwinski, Privacy Materials, in CONSUMER FRN ,',cIA SERVICES Lrrl-
GATION 893, 930 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2001).
9 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 93, at 7.
"Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Benjamin Edelman,
Assistant Professor, Harvard Business School).
l1 App. B.
1
02 Id.
103 Id.041d.
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ners' brands and provides additional credibility and validation as to the qual-
ity of the program or service we are offering."'' 0
The Senate Committee investigation produced evidence of the extent to
which the combination of these practices leads consumers to "accept" a free
trial offer that they would not accept if asked to enter their account numbers.
Data from one of the major preacquired sellers on the Internet, Webloyalty,
shows that consumers are approximately four times more likely to accept the
free trial offer if the referring e-retailer passes the consumer's account infor-
mation to the preacquired seller as opposed to requiring the consumer to
enter her account information. 16
3. Deceived Consumers and Predictably Irrational Consumers
If 70% of consumers will reject the preacquired seller's solicitation
when asked for their full account number, 0 7 then that begs the question of
whether consumers who "accepted" free trial offers through preacquired
marketing ever really understood the terms of the offer. The typical con-
sumer complaint is that the charge appearing on the consumer's account is
unauthorized and that the consumer has no knowledge about the origin of
the charge. 08 Preacquired marketing works in two general ways to reach this
result: (1) by deceiving consumers, especially vulnerable consumers, about
the terms of solicitation and account charge; and (2) by exploiting time- and
decision-making biases of consumers. The following sections describe these
two elements in greater detail.
a. Deception and-vulnerable consumers.
Many consumers never grasp the fundamental terms of the preacquired
marketing offer, and therefore are deceived by the transaction. Consumers
who believe that their accounts cannot be charged unless they provide their
account numbers may never understand that charges were possible from the
offers presented to them.
Other consumers never understood that they were being solicited from
third parties. The blurred identity between the preacquired seller and the
referring seller or account issuer allows preacquired solicitations to appear
as a routine part of the transaction or communication with the referring seller
or account issuer. The "live check" direct mail offer appears to be a rebate
or refund. Internet preacquired sellers, for instance, sometimes make the
preacquired marketing solicitation appear to be a necessary step in the
"check-out" process. Preacquired marketing on the Internet features "decep-
los 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 5.
'COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 16-17.107 Id.
"Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Robert Meyer, Profes-
sor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
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tive designs that invite consumers to conclude, mistakenly, that the offers
come from the companies the consumers have chosen to frequent, and that
the offers are a required part of the checkout process.' 19 The solicitations
used by preacquired sellers often have deceptive features that draw con-
sumer attention away from the disclosures stating that their accounts will be
charged if consumers fail to take further action. 110
The vulnerability of consumers with mental impairment or limited En-
glish language proficiency brings this deception problem into sharp focus."'
Consider the familiar preacquired solicitation of a membership club with
free trial offer that is "accepted" by cashing a "live check." Esther Bilachek
receives what appears to be a check from her bank for $6.35. She is eighty
years old and lives independently, but her mental acuity is diminishing. The
$6.35 check looks to her like a refund from her bank, which she trusts. The
previously described deception problem is that Ms. Bilachek is never asked
to provide her account number, so there is nothing to trigger that visceral
response in her that awakens an understanding that cashing this check may
result in an account charge. But what if Ms. Bilachek has such diminished
mental capacity that she is not really capable of carefully evaluating the
offer, even though she is fully aware that she should not hand over her ac-
count number? What if Ms. Bilachek is a Ukrainian immigrant who under-
stands some English but is far from fluent? Or what if Ms. Bilachek has
Alzheimer's disease?
An example of this latter circumstance appears in a transcript of the
taped verification portion of a preacquired telemarketing call to Robert
Steele, an eighty-five-year-old man with advanced Alzheimer's disease." 2 In
order to verify the sale, the telemarketer has to ask for Mr. Steele's birth date
five times. "' The telemarketer mentions that his age, eighty-five years, "is
not a very long time."'"14 Mr. Steele replies, "It is if you stand on your
head.""' 5 His bank account was charged for a membership club." 6 As the
telemarketer's conversation with Mr. Steele demonstrates, he was unaware
that he was consenting to a sale. Getting an Alzheimer's patient to take out
his credit card to read its number is a very different proposition than getting
an Alzheimer's patient to say his birth date, especially after five attempts.
Io ld. (statement of Benjamin Edelman, Assistant Professor, Harvard Business School).
110d. (statement of Robert Meyer, Professor, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania).
'1 See id. (statement of Prentiss Cox, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law
School) (describing deception of elderly consumers through preacquired marketing). A lawsuit
by Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller recently produced data suggesting that preacquired
seller Vertrue caused charges to accounts disproportionately owned by the elderly. See infra
text accompanying notes 139-43.
"' Second Amended Complaint, supra note 93, at 15 & ex. 7.113 ld at ex. 7.
114 Id.
"' Id. Public enforcement actions by state attorneys general are filled with examples of
elderly consumers charged for membership clubs.
16 Id. at 15.
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b. Exploiting time and decision-making bias.
The clear potential for deception with this type of marketing does not
mean preacquired marketing deceives all, or even most, consumers solicited
at the time they are presented with the free trial offer. Preacquired marketing
also can result in charges unwanted by and unknown to consumers who
nonetheless grasped the initial solicitation either to some degree or fully.
The negative option aspect of the free trial offer is a key contributor to
this result. Negative option marketing has long been known to raise issues of
consumer misunderstanding resulting from this attenuation of the sales pro-
cess."7 Some consumers may not grasp that their accounts can be charged by
negative options through free trial offers without further action by the con-
sumers. As Wharton Business School Professor Robert Meyer explains:
Naive consumers with limited web experience may be taken in for
no reason other than harboring beliefs that the sellers follow the
same norms of ethical exchange that they have [come] to expect
in traditional markets, where payment for goods and services is a
volitional choice made by the consumer, not something one has to
opt out of.",
Yet, consumers who understand the basic terms of the solicitation and
the negative option mechanism with the free trial offer are still routinely
subject to account charges for services they do not want or use. For a con-
sumer to avoid an account charge when enticed by preacquired marketing
solicitation, she has to perform two separate tasks: (1) understand the nature
of this unusual and complex solicitation, and (2) then retain focus on the
solicitation weeks after it has ended. Many consumers simply forget about
the solicitation during the free trial period. This latter task is thus made more
difficult because there is no real reminder of the need to cancel.' 9
The negative option, combined with other features of preacquired mar-
keting, also is problematic because it works partly by exploiting consumer
biases in decision-making. Professor Meyer describes these preacquired
marketing free trial offers as resulting in an "unfortunate paradox" that
consumers:
"17 See, e.g., Peter Bowal, Reluctance To Regulate: The Case Of Negative Option Market-
ing, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 377, 378 (1999); Mark T. Spriggs & John R. Nevin, Negative Option
Selling Plans: Current Forms Versus Existing Regulation, 15 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 227,
234-35 (1996); Dennis D. Lamont, Comment, Negative Option Offers In Consumer Service
Contracts: A Principled Reconciliation Of Commerce And Consumer Protection, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1315 (1995).
... Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Robert Meyer, Profes-
sor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
"I Notice that the free trial offer is about to expire typically appears as junk mail and is
often thrown out. NAAG CoMMENTs II, supra note 20, at 49; Aggressive Sales Tactics Hear-
ing, supra note 45 (statement of Robert Meyer, Professor, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania).
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were drawn to the appeal of a "free trial" period in the belief that
it allowed them to avoid taking the overt action of purchasing the
services-when in fact, it had just the opposite effect. By ac-
cepting the free trial they were implicitly making the decision-
which was surely unintentional-to make purchasing the passive
act, and not purchasing the effortful one. 20
The net result of the preacquired marketing technique is that even among
consumers who had some understanding of the preacquired solicitation at
the time of the offer, a substantial number of them will be mystified as to the
reason that their accounts were charged for services of which they were una-
ware and which they did not want to purchase.
This marketing scheme is an extreme example of the type of market
dysfunction described so persuasively by Professors Elizabeth Warren and
Oren Bar-Gill in advocating for the creation of a Financial Product Safety
Commission. 2' Warren and Bar-Gill observed that consumers have imper-
fect information in making choices about complex credit products and that
consumers also behave irrationally in the credit market. In an important in-
sight, Warren and Bar-Gill note that creditors sell higher cost products by
engaging in detailed analyses of consumer patterns of credit use to identify
and exploit consumer misunderstandings and flaws in risk analysis. 22 Simi-
lar to this concern in complex credit transactions, preacquired sellers have
designed a marketing system based on consumer vulnerabilities that results
in charges for services unknown, and thus essentially non-existent, to the
consumer.
C. The Primary Regulatory Problem with Preacquired
Marketing is Consumer Sorting
As described above, the flood of consumer complaints about account
charges resulting from preacquired marketing comes from consumers who
have varying levels of understanding about the transaction at the time of
solicitation. The public policy problem presented by this type of marketing,
however, is most apparent when examining the power this type of marketing
has to segregate a sufficient number of consumers who are unaware that
their accounts are being charged. Preacquired sellers and their business part-
ners who sell account access use preacquired marketing the way wolves hunt
caribou-they sort out the insufficiently attentive and vulnerable consumers.
I2 Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Robert Meyer, Profes-
sor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
121 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1, 98-100
(2008).
122 Id. at 23-25.
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The existing evidence regarding the consequences of this type of marketing
makes such a predatory analogy appropriate.'
Consumers deemed by the preacquired seller to have accepted a free
trial offer in a typical preacquired marketing solicitation can be grouped into
the following four general categories:
(1) those who accept the free trial offer at the outset because they
are deceived about the offer and do not understand that their ac-
counts can be charged if they fail to cancel;
(2) those who accept the free trial offer with the understanding at
the time of solicitation that there may be later account charges,
but who forget about the solicitation entirely or at least fail to re-
member the need to cancel during the trial period to avoid account
charges;
(3) those who understand the offer and retain their focus on the
matter through the trial period, but determine that they do not want
the service and thus cancel during the trial period; and
(4) those who understand the offer and retain their focus on the
matter through the trial period and who do not cancel because they
want the benefits and know that they are being charged.
Groups 1 and 2 can each be further divided into two subgroups: (A)
consumers who notice the charge on their account statements and attempt to
cancel the service and reverse the charges at that point; and (B) consumers
who do not notice the charges and therefore continue to pay for a service for
which they are unaware that they have been charged. 24
These groups can be charted as follows:
GROUP SUBGROUP A SUBGROUP B
Never Understood Account Could Never Understood Account Could
be Charged; Saw Charge On be Charged; Did Not NoticeStatement and Sought Account Charged & Paid In Full
Cancellation
Understood Account Charge Understood Account Charge
Possible At Solicitation But Possible At Solicitation But
Forgot; Saw Charge On Statement Forgot; Did Not Notice Account
and Sought Cancellation Charged & Paid In Full
3 Understood Offer and Cancelled During Trial Period
4 Understood Offer and Did Not Cancel During Trial Period;
Desired To Pay For Service
123 See infra Part I.D.l.b - m.D.2.
"24 Subgroup B may also include some consumers who discovered the charges on their
account statements, but did not take any action to cancel the service. Group 4 may contain
some consumers initially in Groups 1 or 2, but who discover the charges on their account
statements and decide at that point they want to pay for the service. The data from public
enforcement actions and investigations discussed below suggests that very few consumers fit
either of these profiles. See id.
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It is easy to say that Group 1 was deceived by the solicitation and that
Groups 3 and 4 were not deceived. Group 2 presents a strong, but more
nuanced, argument about whether the consumer's misunderstanding consti-
tutes deception. 25
It is instructive to shift the focus from the varying levels of consumer
cognition to how the seller makes business decisions based on the aggregate
conduct of these groups. Put simply, a preacquired seller and its business
partner providing the account access can profit if Groups 1 and 2 are suffi-
ciently large, even if Group 4 is exceedingly small or non-existent. This is
especially true if Groups 1B and 2B are sufficiently large, as these are con-
sumers who fail to notice the charge and therefore do not take steps to have
them stopped or reversed. 12 6 For services charged annually, such as most
insurance policies and many membership clubs, consumers in Groups 1B
and 2B provide the preacquired seller the full revenue charge for the first
year of the service. These consumers are also likely to continue having the
charge "automatically renewed" at a higher rate and assessed to their ac-
counts annually or for a longer period, thus providing a predictably high
revenue stream. 127 Consumers who are charged monthly may be more likely
to notice the account charges because they are more frequent, but they may
also be less likely to cancel promptly because the amounts are smaller and
thus less noticeable.
This business model of consumer sorting becomes even more profitable
for the preacquired seller and its business partners when considering the cost
side of the equation. Not only do Group 1B and 2B consumers pay for the
membership or other service in full, but they also cost nothing to service.
Membership club benefits often depend on the consumer taking initiative to
request the benefit. For example, a membership club might offer cash back
on purchases or other refunds to consumers who fill out coupons and return
them to the seller. 128 Because consumers in Groups 1B and 2B are unaware
that they are paying for the service, these consumers presumably do not use
the service and, thus, impose little to no cost on the preacquired seller for
providing the service. The same is true for preacquired sellers of insurance
policies. An insured cannot make a claim on a policy she does not know she
holds.
125 See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
126 Because preacquired sellers often refuse to refund to consumers who are charged on an
annual basis the portion of the service cost for the period before the account charge, the preac-
quired seller makes revenue from Groups IA and 2A. See, e.g., 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra
note 8, at 21. Thus, anyone in Groups 1 and 2 can represent revenue to businesses engaged in
preacquired marketing, although it is only Groups 1B and 2B that provide full revenue for the
service.
'27 Id. (stating that "we experience a higher percentage of cancellations during the initial
period as compared to renewal periods," and that "our profitability depends on recurring and
sustained renewals").
28 See, e.g., app. B.
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If preacquired marketing exists because it charges nearly all of its cus-
tomers for services that they do not know they are paying for, it is clearly
employing an undesirable consumer sorting scheme. A growing body of em-
pirical evidence, reviewed in the next section, strongly suggests that preac-
quired marketing works in precisely this manner. The socially adverse
impact of this marketing system operates regardless of whether the percent-
age of consumers subject to this result who never understand the solicitation
is greater or smaller than the percentage of consumers who understood the
account charge process at the time of solicitation and later forgot about their
obligation to cancel during the free trial offer period.
D. Statistical Evidence of Consumer Sorting with
Preacquired Account Marketing
State attorneys general have collected data in their investigations of
preacquired marketing that shed light on the extent to which this type of
marketing operates as a process to sort consumers unaware of charges to
their accounts. The recent work of the Senate Committee provides strong
corroborative evidence for this theory, and further shows that preacquired
marketing on the Internet works almost identically to preacquired marketing
in more established direct marketing channels. 129
1. State Attorneys General Actions and Investigations
Data made public incident to consumer protection enforcement investi-
gations includes information from actions taken by the state attorneys gen-
eral of Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota.
a. Iowa Attorney General's Office Investigative Data.
In 2006, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller filed a law suit against
preacquired seller Vertrue (formerly known as Memberworks). 130 The law-
suit cited a high volume of complaints by Iowans about unauthorized ac-
count charges resulting from a variety of preacquired marketing techniques,
including telephone "upsells," Internet sales and direct mail."'
As part of the investigation leading to the lawsuit, the Iowa Attorney
General's Office sent a survey in December 2004 to four hundred randomly-
selected Iowans who were listed by Vertrue as recent members of a club
'
29 COMMITTE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-8, 17-24.
'
3 Petition in Equity, supra note 71. On March 18, 2010, District Court Judge Robert
Hutchison issued an order following trial finding that Vertrue and related defendants were
liable for violations of the Iowa Buying Club Membership Law, IowA CODE ANN. § 552A
(West 2010), the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16 (West 2010)), and the
Older Iowans Law, IowA CODE ANN. § 714.16A (West 2010). Ruling as to Liability, supra
note 63.
"' Petition in Equity, supra note 71, at 12.
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(with membership beginning after April 1, 2003).132 The eighty-six club
members who returned responsive surveys stated their experiences as
follows:,33
(1) 53 (or 61.6%) responded that they were unaware of the mem-
bership, and that the charge was totally unauthorized;
(2) 23 (or 26.7%) stated that they were aware of the club, but that
they never used it and believed that they had already cancelled;
(3) 7 (or 8.1%) stated generally that the charges were "unautho-
rized," or not asked for; and
(4) 3 (or 3.5%) gave unclear answers that indicated some aware-
ness of the club, but dissatisfaction with the service, including one
member who "felt coerced" into paying for the membership.1 34
The first and by far largest category of survey respondents fits closely with
the definition of Groups 1B and 2B outlined in the previous section. The
second largest group fits either in Groups 2A or 3. The striking result is that
the number of survey respondents in Group 4 ranges somewhere between
0% and 3.5%, depending on whether customers who show some vague
awareness of being a member are included, or are members because they
"felt coerced."
During extensive litigation of this lawsuit, from 2006 through 2010, the
Iowa Attorney General conducted an additional survey and further analysis
of data regarding Vertrue membership clubs. First, in 2008, the Iowa Attor-
ney General's Office conducted another survey of Iowans charged by Ver-
true. This survey focused on Iowa consumers who were charged by Vertrue
eighteen or more times within the prior year; in other words, a group most
likely to be aware of and using the membership club. 135 The Iowa Attorney
General's Office received forty-seven survey responses of the one hundred
customers sent a survey. 3 6 The results were broken into four categories of
the following sizes: unauthorized and unaware (twenty-five, or 53.2%); un-
authorized but recalls solicitation (seven, or 14.9%); authorized and aware
(fourteen, or 29.8%); and other (one, or 2.1%). 1 7 The first two of these cate-
gories directly fit into the Group 1B and 2B archetypes outlined above, and
132 Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 58-59 attach. 13.
133 Id. at 58-59 attach. 13. Not included in this breakdown are the following: one member
whose response was categorized as "unsure" and one survey that was returned with a note
indicating that the member had passed away. Id.
"' Id. Of the three members in this last group, the responses were summarized by the
Iowa Attorney General's Office as follows: "doesn't recall but assumes she said yes," "felt
coerced. . . and felt she [paid] more than she benefitted [sic]," and "somewhat aware and
never used." Id.
"' Plaintiffs Exhibit 456, Memo to Vertrue File from Marc Wallin, Iowa ex rel. Miller v.
Vertrue, Inc., Equity No. EQ 53486 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County Mar. 18, 2010) (on file with
author).
136 Id.
137 Id.
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these groups account for more than two-thirds of surveyed consumers. The
third category fits into the Group 4 archetype. Even among consumers ex-
pressly selected for having been billed repeatedly as active club members,
the number of customers in Group 4 accounted for just under 30% of sur-
veyed consumers.
Second, the Iowa Attorney General's Office examined the reasons that
Iowa consumers complained to the BBB about Vertrue and found that "un-
authorized charges" were the reason for over three-quarters of the com-
plaints. Three hundred randomly selected BBB complaints about Vertrue by
Iowa consumers were examined and broken into three categories of the fol-
lowing sizes: (1) unauthorized charges/know nothing about (230, or 76.7%);
(2) signed up, cancelled and still being charged (30, or 10.0%); or (3) au-
thorized, but problems with program/miscellaneous (40, or 13.3%). 131
Finally, the suit produced some data suggesting that Vertrue's customers
were typically the elderly. A study conducted for Vertrue of online visitors
to Vertrue's Privacy Matters club's website found that these online visitors
were lopsidedly age fifty-five or older.1 39 The number of users in this cate-
gory was 46%, which represented by far the highest percentage of visitors
relative to the general online population of any demographic group analyzed
in the report.140 The report notes that compared to a competing service, "the
biggest skew is in visitors over age 55. ' 141
The Iowa Attorney General's Office also examined the data produced
by Vertrue to determine the prevalence of the elderly (65 and older) among
consumers with frequent billings by Vertrue but no use of the benefits of
Vertrue membership clubs. The study found the number of elderly in this
group was 40.6%, whereas the percentage of elderly in the Iowa adult popu-
lation was approximately 19.9%.142 The study found an over-representation
of elderly regardless of the method of solicitation. 143
I" Plaintiff's Exhibit 458, Memo to Vertrue File from Marc Wallin Dated Oct. 13, 2009 at
1, Iowa ex reL Miller v. Vertrue, Inc., Equity No. EQ 53486 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County Mar.
18, 2010) (on file with author).
3 Plaintiffs Exhibit 263C, "Privacy Matters Demographic and Lifestyle Data-Oct. 27"
at 1, Vertrue, Inc. (Equity No. EQ 53486) [hereinafter Demographic & Lifestyle Data] (on file
with author); see also Proposed Order by Plaintiff at 63, Vertrue, Inc. (Equity No. EQ 53486)
(stating that this exhibit is an internal company document).
" Demographic & Lifestyle Data, supra note 139, at 6.
141 Id. at 1.
42 Plaintiff's Exhibit 228, Memo to Vertrue File from Marc Wallin Dated Oct. 15, 2009 at
1-2, Vertrue, Inc. (Equity No. EQ 53486) (on file with author). The memo describing this
survey notes that census data from 2000, 2004, and 2008 showed the number of Iowans sixty-
five and older represented between 19.4% and 19.9% of the Iowa population aged eighteen
and over.
143 Id. at 2 (finding the following percentage elderly: direct mail (46.7%), Internet
(31.1%), outbound telemarketing (31.0%) and inbound telemarketing (52.1%).
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b. Illinois Attorney General's Office Investigative Data.
The Office of Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan conducted a sur-
vey in 2004 of a national bank's customers who had been charged for one or
more membership clubs after a direct mail solicitation. 144 The bank's custom-
ers had been mailed a "live check" for a small, odd amount, which enrolled
them in a membership club if they failed to cancel during the trial period. 145
Fifty-six customers who cashed these checks were considered by the mem-
bership club seller to be active, paying members of the club at the time that
they were first contacted by the Illinois Attorney General's Office or discov-
ered they were paying for the program when surveyed. 46 However, none of
these individuals stated that they were previously aware that they were mem-
bers of this club or intended to be members. Of these fifty-six bank custom-
ers, thirty-seven expressly indicated that they were unaware that they were
enrolled in and being charged for a membership club. 47 The remaining
nineteen customers provided other responses, none of which indicated the
Group 4 criteria of an awareness of the membership club and an intention to
join the club at the time of the solicitation. 41 In terms of the four groups
outlined above, none of the fifty-six "active" club members were in Group
4. At least thirty-seven and probably all fifty-six of the active club members
were in Groups 1 and 2 (subgroups 1B and 2B), depending on whether they
' Survey of Trilegiant Membership Club Members from Data Provided by the Illinois
Attorney General's Office (2004) (unpublished survey) (on file with the Harvard Journal on
Legislation and the author) [hereinafter Survey of Trilegiant Members]. The Illinois Attorney
General's Office sent a letter to each of the consumers dated May 28, 2004 stating that the
Attorney General's Office had obtained information indicating that the consumer had been
charged for a membership club, that the Attorney General's Office would be contacting the
consumer about this matter, and asking the consumer to collect information about the matter
before the call. Letter from Lisa Madigan, Att'y Gen., State of Ill., to Consumers Charged for a
Trilegiant Membership Club (May 28, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Journal on Legislation
and the author). The data consists of a spreadsheet with the following fields: the name of the
membership club (by initial); consumer statement recalling his or her memory of receiving or
cashing a check; whether the consumer recalls being billed for this amount; whether the con-
sumer was currently an active or cancelled member based on the records provided to the
Illinois Attorney General's Office by the membership club seller; whether the consumer was
voluntarily a member of the club; and "other." Survey of Trilegiant Members, supra. Not all
fields contained data on the spreadsheet for each consumer contacted. Id.
141 See Survey of Trilegiant Members, supra note 144.
14 6 Id.
" Id. One of the thirty-seven consumers who did not know that she was enrolled in the
program decided to remain an active member after speaking with the membership program
when attempting to cancel. Id. The survey results also indicate seven individuals listed as
active members for whom there are no survey responses. Id.
148 Id. These nineteen responses included six consumers who stated that they knew they
were members of the club. These members responded to the survey as follows: two stated that
they did not remember cashing the check; two remembered cashing the check but did not
understand at the time of cashing the check that it could lead to a charge for membership; one
was unsure if the check was cashed because her spouse may have done so; and one was unsure
if the check was cashed and was unaware that cashing the check could lead to membership. Id.
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never understood the membership obligation in the solicitation or just com-
pletely forgot about it by the time the charge appeared.
Another 105 bank customers surveyed had been members of the club
previously, but had cancelled their membership by the time they were con-
tacted by the Illinois Attorney General's Office. 49 Over half of these 105
customers, 56 consumers (53.3%), did not remember cashing the check. 150
Another 43 (41.0%) consumers either remembered cashing the check or
were unsure of having done so. 5' Twenty-seven (25.7%) of these 43 con-
sumers did not understand that cashing the check could lead to membership
and an account charge. 52 Thus, 83 of the overall 105 cancelling consumers,
or 79%, seem to primarily fit the Group 1 profile. By implication then, only
22 (20.9%) of the 105 customers who had cancelled knew or may have
known they were signing up for a membership club by cashing the check.'53
It is unclear from the data how many of these 22 consumers cancelled during
the trial period as opposed to those who cancelled after noticing the account
charge, so it is not known whether they fit into Group 2 (those charged for
the membership in full and then cancelling) or Group 3 (those cancelling
during the trial period).
Of the 161 consumers surveyed in total, none clearly met the profile of
an individual in Group 4-a consumer who cashed the solicitation "live
check," was a member of the club during the trial period, and knowingly
retained a paying membership in the club. 54 This is further evidence that
most consumers who are charged for memberships or other services are in
fact unaware of being charged.
c. Minnesota Attorney General's Office Investigative Data.
Data from investigations by the Office of former Minnesota Attorney
General Mike Hatch also showed that a large number of consumers charged
as a result of preacquired marketing believed that they had not consented to
such a charge.
Records received by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office from a
subsidiary of one of the nation's largest banks indicated that 173,543 bank
'49 Id. This data excludes four consumers who recall being contacted by a phone solicita-
tion rather than a direct mail solicitation and six consumers listed as cancelled members for
whom there are no survey responses. In addition, six consumers were coded as neither active
nor cancelled, and their status could not be confirmed from the data provided.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. Only seven of these twenty-two consumers clearly remembered cashing the check,
stated they understood that doing so could lead to membership, and stated that they clearly
remember being members. The remainder gave a variety of other responses.
" Id. Combining all three categories of membership status (active, cancelled, and other),
only twenty of the 177 consumers (or 11.3%) expressly stated that they were ever aware they
had enrolled in the membership program by cashing the check, and all of these twenty con-
sumers cancelled the club membership. Id.
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customers cancelled membership clubs or insurance policies sold through
preacquired marketing during a thirteen-month period.'55 More than 55% of
the customers cancelling the charge stated that "unauthorized bill" was the
reason for the requested cancellation. 156 "Request to cancel," was the reason
given for 32% of the total cancellations, which is a general category that
includes an untold number of customers who believed that the charge was
not authorized.'57 Making an unrealistically conservative assumption that
only the 55% figure represents all of the customers who cancelled for the
reason that they thought the charge unauthorized, that means that 95,573
customers of a single national bank subsidiary alleged unauthorized charges
were made to their accounts as a result of preacquired marketing. 15
The Minnesota Attorney General's Office also released data on cancel-
lations of memberships by Minnesota customers of two different financial
institutions involved in a preacquired marketing scheme for the sale of mem-
bership clubs using a thirty-day free trial offer. 59 The data reflect the period
of time from membership club enrollment to date of cancellation.' 6 Con-
sumers who knowingly purchased the free trial offer would likely want to try
the service and decide whether to stay enrolled or to cancel the membership
during the free trial period to avoid being charged. If all consumers under-
stood the free trial offer solicitation and acted rationally, therefore, the tem-
poral pattern of cancellations should be heavily weighted toward
cancellations during the free trial period. A graph of cancellations under this
assumption of consumer understanding should look vaguely like the
following: 161
155 MINN. Arr'y GEN.'S OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF THE MINNESOTA AT-rOR-
NEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN THE MATTER oF: TELEMARKETING SALES RULE REVIEW, FFC FILE
No. R411001 4 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/sup-
plement/minnag.pdf [hereinafter MINNESOTA COMMENTS]. The author worked on the produc-
tion of this document while an Assistant Attorney General in the Minnesota Attorney General's
Office.
15 6 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 5-6.
" Id. at 4.
161 The graph is a hypothetical chart of what customer cancellations may have looked like
based on customers who fully understood the solicitation and acted rationally to cancel during
the trial period and thus avoid an account charge. The numbers on the graph are derived from
the Minnesota Attorney General's cancellation data, id., and reflect the percentages one would
expect to see in this scenario.
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The actual cancellation pattern from customers of the two financial institu-
tions can be graphed as follows:162
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Specifically, only 24.6% (921 of 3770) of the banks' customers acted like
Group 3 members and cancelled in the first thirty days. 63 About half of these
customers, 49.4% (1864 of 3770), cancelled in the thirty-one- to ninety-day
period after enrollment, when the free trial period had ended and the custom-
ers most likely noticed the initial charges on their account statements. 164
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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The data are again consistent with a large majority of the cancelling
customers not understanding the solicitation and canceling only after the
charge appears on their accounts. In terms of the four-group outline, this
would mean Groups IA and 2A together are substantially larger than Group
3. Because only some percentage of consumers in Groups 1 and 2 will notice
the charge on their account statements and sort into subgroup A, a substan-
tially large number of consumers in Groups 1 and 2 likely implies that there
is also a sizable number of consumers in Groups 1B and 2B who fail to
notice the charges and pay for the full price of the membership club.
Evidence from the Minnesota Attorney General action against Fleet
Mortgage Corporation, another financial institution, is also noteworthy. Fleet
sold a variety of preacquired sellers the right to charge its customers' mort-
gage accounts. 65 The suit alleged that Fleet's written mortgage statements
hid the charges in small print under the name "opt. prod." (optional product)
at the bottom of the bills. 66 The suit also alleged that Fleet gave no written
notice of the charges to homeowners using automatic draft for mortgage
payments. 67 The investigation found an internal Fleet survey of its customer
service representatives estimating that about 20% of all service calls were
from mortgage customers complaining about these charges. 68 In the survey,
Fleet employees shared the resentment created by the deceptive charges for
these programs. Some of the comments from Fleet's service representatives
about the charges included the following: "unethical," "a scam," and "a
fraud."' 169 One service representative stated, "[Homeowner] knows they are
being slammed [with insurance] they never auth[orized]. [Homeowner]
thinks unethical & bad business by us .... I agree with the customer."'
70
2. The Senate Commerce Committee Investigation Data
The Senate Commerce Committee investigation of preacquired market-
ing on the Internet similarly revealed low levels of actual consumer consent
to account charges. In addition to anecdotal evidence of consumer misunder-
standing and anger about account charges, the investigation unearthed data
indicating extraordinarily low levels of consumer understanding about the
memberships they allegedly purchased. The Senate report quotes an e-mail
165 Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Minn.
2001); see also Complaint at 17, Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962 (No. 01-48/
ADM).
"6 Complaint, supra note 165, at 8, 17-18.
167 id. at 17.
168 Id. at 8-9, ex. 2.
169 Id.
170 Id. The settlement of this case provided for full reimbursement of membership club
fees for Minnesota consumers. Stipulation of Settlement at 3, Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F.
Supp. 2d 962 (No. 01-CV-48/ADM/AJB). To obtain a refund, the consumer had to sign a
statement that, "I did not expressly authorize the charges on my mortgage account for a mem-
bership program." MINNESOTA CoMMENTs, supra note 155, at 5-6.
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from a Webloyalty employee stating, "[a]t least 90% of our members don't
know anything about the membership."'' 71
The Senate Committee did not conduct its own surveys of purported
club members, as did the Iowa and Illinois attorneys general, but rather re-
ported on internal surveys of members by a preacquired seller and two of its
referring sellers.'72 None of these surveys provided clear data on whether the
members intended to purchase the service, but they do confirm that most of
these consumers were unaware that they were members.'73 For example, a
referring seller for Webloyalty surveyed 308 current and past members, half
of whom were described as active. 74 The survey found that 76% of those
surveyed either did not recall being offered the membership or thought they
had declined the membership. 75 Surveys of other referring sellers to
Webloyalty produced similar results. 176
Cancellation data also reflected profound misunderstanding by consum-
ers paying for club memberships. Webloyalty had 66,922 membership can-
cellations in the month of August 2003 alone, and the reason for cancellation
stated by slightly more than 77% of those consumers was "Did Not Author-
ize/Was Not Aware."' 177 The Senate investigation also produced strikingly
similar results to those released by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office
as to temporal cancellation patterns. Combined data for Affinion, Vertrue, or
Webloyalty's memberships sales over the Internet showed that "about a
quarter of their members (26.2%) cancel during the free 30-day period, less
than a third of their members (29.5%) are still members after six months and
only 13.9% remain members for more than one year."' 178
Consumers visiting preacquired seller websites, or calling these sellers,
overwhelmingly did so for the purpose of cancelling the membership or
complaining about the account charge. Affinion trains its call center employ-
ees to expect about 80% of calls to be from consumers wanting to cancel
membership. 179 Similarly, a survey of Vertrue employees revealed that an
estimated 98% of the seven million customer calls each year were for can-
cellation of membership. 180 The Senate investigation also found that a sam-
ple of one day of visitors to a Vertrue website identified 87% of those
171 COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 7, at iii.
172 Id. at 18-20.
171 Id. at 18 ("Internal data and member surveys commissioned by Affinion, Vertrue, and
Webloyalty clearly show that the three companies understand that the majority of their paying
'members' have little or no awareness of their financial relationship with the companies.").
1741 id. at 19.
175 Id.
176 Id. (noting that "[clustomer surveys conducted for Choice Hotels International, Inc.
and Classmates.com, both Webloyalty partners, produced similar results").
177 Id. at 18.
178 COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
179 Id. at 21 (citing AFFINION GROUP, INc., GREAT FUN NEW HIRE TRAn-n'N MANUAL
(2006)).
1'o Id. at iii.
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website visitors as wanting to either find out about an unknown account
charge or cancel membership.'
3. Usage data.
This lack of interest in the benefits of the service purportedly purchased
by consumers raises the issue of usage of services purchased by preacquired
sellers. If the thesis of this Article is accurate, then club members over-
whelmingly are unaware of these benefits because they are unaware that
they are even club members. Accordingly, usage numbers for these benefits
should be low.
Again consider the Budget-Trilegiant solicitation as an example. Mem-
bers in the Everyday Values club pay $119.99 annually for the membership
and are promised three types of benefits: (1) a check for up to one hundred
dollars for 2% credit card cash back on purchases up to five thousand dollars
per year; (2) four checks of ten dollars each for reimbursement of gas or
grocery expenses; and (3) various discounts at restaurants and retailers. 82 To
obtain the one hundred dollars for credit card cash back, the club member
must submit annually a copy of credit card statements totaling up to five
thousand dollars.'83 Similarly, the club member is given four ten-dollar cou-
pons to be submitted quarterly for the gas and grocery reimbursement. 84
If club members were aware of the charge for the membership club,
then a substantial number of club members paying the $119.99 membership
fee should have either requested the one hundred dollars in credit card cash
back or submitted at least one of the seasonal ten-dollar coupons. Yet this
preacquired solicitation appears, on its face, to assume that at least a large
number of members would not claim the benefits offered by the program.
Revenue from each club member, which is $119.99 the first year and
$129.99 the following year, is less than the $140 that each member could
obtain by taking advantage of the offered reimbursements.'85 Thus, members
using the service as intended would result in negative net revenue for the
preacquired seller. This negative net revenue would exist even before con-
sidering the substantial sales costs, including the bank's or referring seller's
share of revenue, and the operational costs of the preacquired seller.
Both the Iowa Attorney General case against Vertrue and the Senate
investigation revealed very low levels of usage benefits by consumers pay-
ing for membership clubs. The Iowa case revealed that 863,970 Iowans were
or had been in a Vertrue membership program, but 731,575 of these mem-
bers, or 84.68%, never used any benefits of the club. 86 For Iowa members
'8' Id. at 18.
182 See app. B.
183 Id.
184Id.
185 Id.
186 Ruling as to Liability, supra note 63, at 15.
459.
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who were still considered active by Vertrue in May 2009, "91.5% of mem-
berships involved no benefit usage whatsoever."'87
The Senate investigation was unable to obtain comprehensive usage in-
formation from the preacquired sellers it investigated.'88 However, the lim-
ited data obtained indicates very low usage by consumers charged for
membership clubs. The three companies examined in the Senate investiga-
tion promised over thirty-four million purported members that they would
receive cash back or other incentives on joining the club; however, only 3%
of members actually received the promised benefit. 189 Data from Webloyalty
further suggest member usage of ".2% and 11.4% for a six month period
between 2004 and 2005."'19 The Webloyalty survey of 308 members de-
scribed above found only 1.6% who had received a promised "$10 cash
back offer" and 1.3% who indicated use of program discounts."'
Furthermore, website usage for purposes of accessing program benefits
appears to be negligible. The Senate report concluded that website usage was
"very low" based on the limited data that the investigated preacquired sell-
ers provided to the Senate Committee. 192 The information from Vertrue's
website sample, which confirmed more than 87% of members visited the site
to cancel, also showed that "[o]nly one member indicated he or she was
there to 'find out more about my membership benefits' and none of the re-
spondents were there to 'obtain [a] member ID'.'193
E. Consumer Sorting with Seller-retained Account Information
Preacquired marketing is a distinct form of market conduct from a
seller's retention and reuse of its consumer account numbers. A seller may
retain a consumer's account number for ease of use in a later transaction.
Sellers frequently retain account numbers to periodically bill consumers for
on-going services or regular delivery of goods. Many websites routinely ask
consumers buying merchandise if they want the site to retain their credit
card numbers for later purchases.
Nonetheless, sellers do retain and reuse account numbers to engage in
preacquired marketing-type behavior. For instance, Damark was a nation-
wide general catalog retailer with a substantial customer base. 94 Consumers
... Id. at 34. These usage numbers were for benefit use traceable by Vertrue, but the trial
court also found that benefits that were not traceable by Vertrue were not significantly used
even by the "very rare individuals" that exhibited substantial use of traceable benefits. Id. at
16 n.22.8 CoMmrrrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
'
89 Id. at 23.
10 Id.
191 Id. at 19, 23.
192 Id. at 23.
'
93 Id. at 19.
'94 Assurance of Discontinuance, Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Damark Int'l, Inc., No. C8-
99-10638 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 1999).
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calling Damark would provide their credit card numbers to order goods from
the company, and then Damark would use the credit cards provided by its
customers to upsell its own membership clubs using trial offers with a nega-
tive option, resulting in the same problem of massive complaints of unautho-
rized charges. 95 Public enforcement actions revealed other companies that
relied on merchandise sales as an introduction to the more profitable venture
of preacquired marketing. 196 This conduct with seller-retained information
mimics the tactics of preacquired marketing and creates the same adverse
result of consumer misunderstanding and confusion. The proposed UCACA
differentiates between these forms of seller-retained account marketing and
limits the ban only to those sellers who mimic the preacquired marketing
tactics.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT REGULATORY, MARKET,
AND LITIGATION RESPONSES
Neither market forces nor litigation has been or likely will be an effec-
tive solution to preacquired marketing. The only federal legislation on the
matter was rendered effectively useless by regulations subsequently promul-
gated by federal financial institution regulators. Some limited progress in
controlling preacquired marketing in the telemarketing context occurred
through amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule.
A. Failure of Market Self-Controls
The market responses that can work to restrict deceptive practices are
not effective in the context of preacquired marketing. Preacquired marketing
works by sorting out less attentive and vulnerable consumers from a vast
number of consumers actively solicited through direct marketing. Consum-
ers do not initiate the buying process, and membership clubs are not the type
of product that consumers commonly research through sources like Con-
sumer Reports. Even if education could reach millions of consumers cur-
rently charged for unwanted services, these efforts would only slightly alter
the percentage of consumers sorted into the vast numbers who reject the
solicitation.
"' Id. Damark later changed its name to Provell. Provell, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K), at 3 (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http:lwww.sec.gov/Archivesedgar/data883324000091
205702015504/a2073889z10-k.htm. Damark/Provell found the practice of selling membership
clubs so profitable that it ceased its catalog operations to focus on becoming a preacquired
seller with account issuers and referring sellers. Id. ("The Company had historically operated
in three distinct businesses and marketplaces: catalog marketing, membership and e-fulfill-
ment. The Company now operates in a single business segment: membership and customer
relationship management programs."). Provell charged millions of consumers for membership
clubs. Id. at 23.
I" FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4598 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
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An obvious market solution to the problem is to rely on the adverse
reputational consequences for the companies involved in this practice.
Preacquired marketing is a direct marketing program, so reputational con-
cerns have less impact on the preacquired seller. Consumers are responding
to the solicitation rather than making an affirmative choice to seek out the
seller. Perhaps more importantly, the primary initial brand presentation with
preacquired marketing is the name of the account issuer or referring seller.
One has to scour the footnotes of the sample Budget solicitation to find out
that Trilegiant is the actual seller, for example.197
This leads to the more promising possibility of account issuers and re-
ferring sellers abandoning preacquired marketing relationships because of
reputational interests. When this form of marketing was first exposed a dec-
ade ago, U.S. Bancorp agreed to stop cooperating with preacquired sellers,
and some other banks joined that pledge. 98 Yet large consumer institutions,
including major banks, still continue to form the backbone of this type of
marketing. 99 Although the Senate Committee investigation directed substan-
tial public attention to the problems with Internet preacquired marketing, the
investigation clearly has not solved the problem. More than two months after
the release of the report and hearing, only eight of the more than 450 e-
commerce websites and retailers using preacquired marketing, albeit several
of the most well-known and well-compensated, had announced to the Com-
mittee that they would withdraw from business relationships with preac-
quired sellers.200
One reason for the refusal to disassociate with preacquired sellers may
be that the short-term profitability for the banks, other account issuers, and
the referring sellers outweighs the reputational damage. The Senate Commit-
tee found that "more than 450 e-commerce companies and e-retailers" had
engaged in preacquired marketing with just three preacquired sellers-Affi-
nion, Vertrue, and Webloyalty-over the previous ten years,20' and that
eighty-eight of these companies had earned over one million dollars from
their participation in preacquired marketing with these three companies, and
nineteen of those eighty-eight companies had earned over ten million dol-
lars. 022 As Professor Adam Levitin noted with regard to consumer financial
197 See app. B.
198 NATHANmL STERLING, CAL. LAW REvISON COMMN, STUDY B-400, FIRST SUPPLE-
MENT TO MEMORANDUM 2003-19 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2003/
MM03-19sl.pdf.
199 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
20 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Internet Retailers-
Including Fandango, Priceline.com and 1-800Flowers.com-Change Misleading Marketing
Tactics in Response to Rockefeller's Landmark Investigation (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http:/
/commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p = HearingsandPressReleases&ContentRecordid =
27af7162-5d3d-42bf-8f91-b 160c7061a28&ContentType-id=77eb43da-aa94-497d-a73f-5c951
ff72372&Groupid= 165806cd-d931-4605-aa86-7fafc5fd3536.
201 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
2 21 Id. at 14.
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services generally, "Unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices ... can be
highly profitable. 20 3
Perhaps a more compelling reason for why reputation is not an effective
constraint may be that the adverse reputational consequences for the account
issuers and sellers are mitigated by the structure of the trial offer. The solici-
tation is usually closely tied to the reputation of the account issuer or refer-
ring seller. Consumers who discover the account charges on their statements
that they believe are unauthorized, however, see the preacquired seller listed
as the initiator of the charge. 2°4 Many preacquired marketing companies use
a variety of names, including abbreviations of the company name or names
of one of their clubs.205 These statements typically also have the phone num-
ber of the preacquired seller listed with the charge, so the consumer is di-
rected to call the preacquired seller.2°0 Further, if the consumer calls the
account issuer or referring seller, it will refer the consumer to the preac-
quired seller.207
Because these unhappy consumers do not believe that they ever author-
ized the charges, they may be less likely to link the account issuers or refer-
ring sellers to their displeasure with the solicitations, which they do not
remember at all or in significant detail. Thus, account issuers are able to use
their reputations to help diffuse consumer resistance to the initial solicita-
tion, while shifting the locus of responsibility to the preacquired seller when
the displeased consumer complains of unauthorized charges.
Preacquired account marketing agreements have also been structured to
insulate complaining consumers from the knowledge that the account issuers
and referring sellers are partly responsible for the unwanted account charges.
Contracts between preacquired sellers and account issuers regularly include
provisions requiring that all customer complaints be referred to the preac-
quired seller and that financial institutions never have to code the complaints
203 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency 4 (Georgetown Law Pew
Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 2, 2009). Professor Levitin also makes the argument
that banks in particular have faced conflicting pressures from safety and soundness regulation,
which might encourage the profitability of deceptive practices and consumer protection regula-
tion that would limit deceptive practices. Id. Professor Levitin observes, "[H]istorically con-
sumer protection has not won out ...." Id.
24 Mark Huffman, Iowa Sues Vertrue for Consumer Fraud, CONSUMERAIFAms.coM, May
31, 2006, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/05/iavertrue.html.
205 Id. Charges by Vertrue appear on credit card statements as "MWI" or one of the club
names "HomeWorks," "Simple Escapes," "Connections," "Essentials," or "Leisure Advan-
tage." Id. Charges by Affinion Group, Inc. appear on credit card statements under up to sev-
enty different club and business names. BBB, BBB Review of Affinion Group in Norwalk,
CT, http://www.bbb.org/connecticut/business-reviews/buying-clubs-and-group-purchasing-ser
vice/affinion-group-in-norwalk-ct-41001179 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010); see also Affinion
Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at ex. 21.1 (Feb. 26, 2010) (listing subsidiaries of
Affinion Group, Inc.).
206 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 24; MINNESOTA COMMENTS, supra note 155, at
1-2. 207 MINNESOTA COMMENTarS, supra note 155, at 2-3.
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as a disputed charge under federal credit card dispute resolution rules.2° The
Senate investigation revealed that the same is true with referring sellers. The
Senate report described an email from Affinion stating that it has a
"STRICT no-no" policy on sending complaining customers back to the re-
ferring seller.209 The Senate report concludes that "Affinion, Webloyalty, and
Vertrue handle dissatisfied customers in order to insulate the partners from
their own customers' criticism, which is commonly described as 'customer
noise' by the companies."210 Since the reputation of referring sellers is not
affected by customer complaints, market forces will not work to curb the
practice.
B. Legislative and Rule-Making Responses
The exposure of deception and massive consumer misunderstanding
with preacquired marketing that has occurred through public enforcement
actions has led to legislative and administrative attempts to ban its use.2"'
Congress and the FTC took actions that appeared to be a ban on the use of
preacquired marketing in certain contexts. 212 The seemingly broad congres-
sional ban on preacquired account use by any financial institution, however,
was completely neutered by regulation. Additionally, the much narrower ini-
tial FTC ban on preacquired account information in telemarketing was con-
verted in the final regulation to a lesser restriction of the practice.
1. Title V of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act
The action against U.S. Bancorp by state attorneys general in 1999 trig-
gered a flood of public disapproval of financial institutions' sharing account
information with direct marketers.2"3 This disapproval resulted in the quick
addition of Title V to the GLBA in November 1999.214 The GLBA included a
provision that appears to ban preacquired marketing through account issuers,
which was the subject of the U.S. Bancorp suit. Section 502(d) of Title V
states:
208 Id. at 2-4.
2 9 COMMrT-rEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 24-25.
2 Old. at 24.
2 11 In addition to the federal government actions discussed in this section, there has been
limited activity at the state level to restrict preacquired marketing. Idaho has the only enacted
state law on the topic, but it is limited to preacquired telemarketing. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-
1003B (West 2009). It is similar to, but somewhat less protective than, the Telemarketing Sales
Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2009).
212 See infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
213 See, e.g., MINNESOTA CoMMENTs, supra note 155.
214 GLBA, Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. V, §§ 501-09, 113 Stat. 1436-43 (1999) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006)). The influence of the U.S. Bancorp suit is discussed above.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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(d) Limitations on the sharing of account number information for
marketing purposes. A financial institution shall not disclose,
other than to a consumer reporting agency, an account number or
similar form of access number or access code for a credit card
account, deposit account, or transaction account of a consumer to
any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail
marketing, or other marketing through electronic mail to the
consumer. 15
At first read, this provision seems to ban the use of preacquired market-
ing between financial institutions and preacquired sellers. Title V of the
GLBA, however, also authorized the promulgation of rules by the federal
banking regulators and the FTC to enforce the Act.2 16 The resulting "Regula-
tion P," promulgated on June 1, 2000, essentially made section 502(d)
meaningless as a limit on the process of preacquired marketing from the
consumer's perspective or on the undesirable consequences from this type of
marketing.27 The relevant part of the regulation states, "An account number,
or similar form of access number or access code, does not include a number
or code in an encrypted form, as long as the bank does not provide the
recipient with a means to decode the number or code.121 1
Under this rule, a financial institution can provide a preacquired seller
the contact information and an encrypted number for the customer. When
the preacquired seller obtains what it and the financial institution determine
to be consent to an account charge, the preacquired seller identifies the cus-
tomer to the financial institution, which decrypts the number and charges the
customer's account. Thus, the rule very narrowly interprets the statute's pro-
hibition on disclosing "an account number or similar form of access number
or access code," and leaves the financial institution free to empower the
preacquired seller to initiate charges to its customers' accounts.21 9 This regu-
latory regime leaves the consumer misunderstanding problem in preacquired
marketing wholly unaffected. From the consumer's perspective, there is no
difference between how the solicitation and charges from a preacquired ac-
count transaction occurred before and after the enactment of Title V of the
25 See Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. V, § 502(d), 113 Stat. 1437 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6802(d) (2006)).
216 See § 504(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6804(a) (2006)).
217 12 C.F.R. § 40.12 (2009). Regulation P was adopted jointly by the federal banking
regulators, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FTC, and an identical regulation was put in
place in various sections of the code of federal regulations corresponding to the rules of each
agency. See Michael A. Benoit and Elena A. Lovoy, Recent Federal and State Consumer
Financial Privacy Developments, 57 Bus. LAW. 1209, 1209 n.2 (2002) (listing all the jointly
enacted regulations).
218 12 C.F.R. § 40.12(c)(1) (2009).
219 The Conference Committee on the GLBA specifically noted in its report that the fed-
eral regulators drafting Regulation P could take this narrow approach to interpreting the stat-
ute, but nothing in the Conference Committee Report required this action. H.R. R-PP. No. 106-
434, at 173 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
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GLBA. The consumer still has her account charged without providing her
account number, and the encryption and decryption of that number occurs in
the data processing systems of the financial institutions out of sight of the
consumer.
220
2. Telemarketing Sales Rule
Shortly after the enactment of the GLBA, and during the promulgation
of Regulation P, the FTC tackled preacquired marketing issues in the context
of telemarketing in its amendment of the Telemarketing Sales Rule
("TSR"). 221 The TSR is the primary federal law governing the content and
restrictions on telemarketing solicitations. 222 In its 2002-03 amendments to
the TSR, the FTC enacted the federal do-not-call list.223 Another part of the
proposed amendments to the TSR at that time was a ban on preacquired
marketing for telemarketing. 224
The proposed rule published for comment by the FTC on January 30,
2002 expressly prohibited the use of preacquired marketing in telemarketing
and declared it to be an abusive practice. 2 5 The final rule was less restrictive
and it was more complicated. The FTC ultimately adopted a broad definition
of "preacquired account information" as "any information that enables a
seller or telemarketer to cause a charge to be placed against a customer's...
account without obtaining the account number directly from the customer
... during the telemarketing transaction pursuant to which the account will
be charged. ' 226 The critical portion of the final rule required that
telemarketers using preacquired account information in combination with a
"free-to-pay conversion" (a free trial with negative option) must obtain from
220 Later guidance documents from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC") make clear the reach of section 502(d) only extends to whether the financial institu-
tion reveals unencrypted account numbers. OCC, OCC BULLETIN 2001-26 ATTACHMENT, PRI-
VACY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION 28 (2001), available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2001-26a.pdf (requiring of examiners that they only "review a
sample of telemarketer scripts used when making sales calls to determine whether the scripts
indicate that the telemarketers have the account numbers of the institution's consumers.").
221 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2009).
222 The other federal regulatory regime governing telemarketing limits when telemarketing
and automatic dialing can be used, but not the content of the solicitation. 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2006); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2009).
223 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2009).
224 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 4492 (proposed Jan. 30, 2002) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
225 The initial rle change proposed by the FTC would have prevented a telemarketer from
using, and any other person (including financial institutions and other sellers) from disclosing,
"billing information" for use in telemarketing. Id. at 4543 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
§ 310.4(a)(5)). Billing information was broadly defined to mean "any data that provides ac-
cess to a consumer's or donor's account, such as a credit card, checking, savings, share or
similar account, utility bill, mortgage loan account or debit card." Id. at 4540 (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. § 310.2(c)). The FTC commented in its notice of the proposed rule that these provi-
sions would "effectively eliminate the trade in preacquired billing information." Id. at 4501.
226 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(w) (2009).
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the consumer the last four digits of the consumer's account number to be
charged.2 7 The free-to-pay concept was intended to capture the use of free
trial offers.221 The FTC Statement on the rule summarized the intended effect
as forcing the consumer "to reach into his or her wallet, and provide at least
a portion of the account number to be charged. '229
No public data exists directly reflecting the effectiveness of this restric-
tion, and it is difficult to sort out the impact of the rule change.230 A change
in the pattern of public enforcement actions against preacquired marketing
suggests that it may have worked to reduce preacquired telemarketing. Prior
to the promulgation of the rule, public actions focused on telemarketing,
while later cases focused more on direct mail and other forms of preacquired
solicitation. 23' Conversely, it is clear that the amended rule proved easy to
avoid by circumventing the narrow definition of "free-to-pay conversions."
Sellers began to charge one dollar to the account immediately in order to
evade the impact of the rule.232 Preacquired sellers also have circumvented
the rule by characterizing their relationship so that the preacquired seller is
deemed to be a "wholesaler" of the membership club sold by the account
issuer or referring seller.233 Finally, it is difficult to sort the impact of this
portion of the amended rule from the decline in telemarketing generally be-
cause of the do-not-call list, which proved highly popular and resulted in a
tremendous contraction of the telemarketing industry. 23 4
C. Public and Private Litigation Has Had a Limited Effect
Litigation also has been an ineffective control on preacquired marketing
abuses. A decade of UDAP public enforcement actions has only led to re-
quired disclosures in some contexts. 235 Also, there is a limit to the remedies
that most judges are likely to entertain in an UDAP action when an injunc-
227 § 310.4(a)(6)(i)(A).
228 § 310.2(o). The FTC also added a definition for negative option as part of its imple-
mentation and regulation of this requirement. § 310.2(t).
229 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 458.0, 4621 (Jan, 29, 2003) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
230 See generally Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Prentiss
Cox, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School).
231 See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g., Bosworth, supra note 65.
233 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 6.
234 Kathryn Clayton, Don't Call Me: Learn Nuts and Bolts of Federal No-call Registry,
DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), July 3, 2003, at COI (noting estimates of
80% reduction in telemarketing calls and a 25-50% reduction in the telemarketing industry).
235 See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Memberworks, Inc., No. MC99-010056 (4th Dist.
Minn. Apr. 2000) (on file with Author) (requiring various disclosures and double refunds for
certain future complainants); Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Chase Bank USA,
N.A. (Iowa Att'y Gen. Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.ia.us/govemment/ag/lat-
est news/releases/dec_2006/Chase%20AVC.pdf (requiring as part of a multistate settlement
Chase have its marketers make various disclosures depending on whether the solicitation in-
volved a live check offer); Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Citibank (N.Y. Att'y Gen. Feb.
27, 2002) (requiring as part of a multistate settlement that Citibank enter into agreements with
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tion must be narrowly tailored to remedy a violation. If the allegations in the
case are that many consumers are deceived by preacquired marketing solici-
tations, then the likely range of injunctive remedies probably will focus on
better disclosures. More or better disclosures will not remedy the problem.
236
Not surprisingly, UDAP actions have very rarely resulted in even a partial
ban on an entire marketing practice.
Private legal actions have had less success. Most private actions pro-
ceed partly or primarily on a UDAP theory. 37 Private litigants have had less
success than public enforcement agencies in surviving motions to dismiss on
this theory, and some cases have been dismissed because the disclosures
were deemed by the court to be adequate to make the solicitation non-decep-
tive as a matter of law. 238 As the sample direct mail solicitations in the ap-
pendices show, preacquired sellers routinely disclose that consumers will be
charged if they take the free benefits offered and fail to cancel the service
within the specified trial period.23 9 The argument that disclosures by preac-
quired sellers are inadequate to remedy consumer deception also has been
made in numerous cases and in detailed analyses by Professors Meyer and
Marotta-Wurgler, 24° but the existence of the disclosures has been an insur-
mountable hurdle for some private actions.2 4 1 Because of the amount in dis-
pute in each transaction, only class action cases are feasible for private
preacquired sellers that mandate disclosures as to terms of sale, refund policy, automatic re-
newals, and other matters).
236 See infra Part V.A.
237 As with many areas of consumer protection law, preacquired account marketing abuses
cannot be effectively addressed by traditional common law contract theories, which stress
objective tests and impose a duty to read. See John D. Calamari, Duty to Read - A Changing
Concept, 43 FORoHAm L. REV. 341 (1974). Usually, although not always, the preacquired
seller and the account issuer enter into contracts requiring that the written disclosures or stan-
dardized oral disclosures contain the essential terms of the deal. Scholars have built compel-
ling arguments for law reform that would apply a different legal framing to standard form
contracts for consumer use. See Wayne R. Barnes, Toward A Fairer Model of Consumer Assent
to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV.
227 (2007); Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Con-
sumer Contracts And Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 747 (2009). Yet,
it remains an uphill battle in today's courts to attack contracts in which all relevant disclosures
exist, however overshadowed the disclosures are by diverting information.
238 See, e.g., In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing & Sales Practices Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1318
(J.P.M.L. 2009); Spivey v. Adaptive Marketing, LLC, No. 07-cv-0779, 2009 WL 3064927
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2009). Legal theories other than deception also have been dismissed in
putative class actions involving preacquired marketing. See, e.g., Sanford v. Memberworks,
Inc., No. 02CV0601, 2008 WL 4482159 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (dismissing claims under
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and the Unordered Merchandise Act); Memberworks, Inc. v.
Yance, 899 So.2d 940 (Ala. 2004) (granting Memberworks's motion to compel arbitration).
239 See apps. B.
240 See Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statements of Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Associate Professor, New York University School of Law, and Robert Meyer, Profes-
sor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
241 Spivey, 2009 WL 3064927.
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litigation, and class certification also has proved problematic in some
cases.
242
V. THE CASE FOR BANNING PREACQUIRED ACCOUNT MARKETING
The best solution to unknown and unwanted account charges resulting
from preacquired marketing is to ban its use by statute or rule. Preacquired
marketing has unique features that should ease any concern about a blanket
prohibition; specifically, the prohibition can easily be avoided by a seller (by
simply asking for consumer account information), and the public 'benefit
from this practice is negligible at best. The often difficult problem of con-
structing the proper scope for such a prohibition persists, but is more easily
surmounted here than in comparable regulatory matters. The legislation pro-
posed by this Article, entitled "Uniform Consumer Account Control Act"
("UCACA") is intended to reach this result. 243
A. The Rationale For Banning Preacquired Account Marketing
The starting point for considering a ban on a marketplace practice is a
clear understanding of the social costs and benefits from the activity. It is
difficult to argue that market conduct shown to be significantly harmful to
consumers but that produces no clear public benefit should be allowed.
Preacquired sellers and advocates for unrestrained markets may nonetheless
argue that measures short of a ban will suffice to remedy the problem. These
arguments also are addressed below.
The only potential benefit to the public in allowing preacquired market-
ing has to derive from the seller avoiding the act of acquiring the account
number and related account access data from the consumer who owns the
account. This is because a seller that has the consent of the consumer to be
charged for a transaction also could obtain payment by acquiring the account
number directly from the consumer.
The TSR rule-making process developed a record for the alleged bene-
fits of preacquired marketing. The FTC's Notice of Proposed Rule-Making
published in conjunction with the initial proposed rule banning the use of
preacquired account information in telemarketing sought industry response
242 See McNair v. Synapse Group, Inc., No. 06-5072, 2009 WL 1873582 (D.N.J. June 29,
2009) (denying class certification and holding that "even if it is accepted that Synapse's prac-
tices were deceptive and uniform, Plaintiffs make no attempt to provide a causation link; they
do not adequately explain why the alleged conduct is likely to effect [sic] all class members in
the same way."). But see Ritt v. Billy Blanks Enters., 870 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
(permitting class certification regarding UDAP claims against Memberworks and referring
seller of "TaeBo" tapes).
243 The UCACA proposed here does not include remedies or other important provisions
that would need to be adapted to the context in which it is enacted. See infra app. A. Although
suggested in the form of a uniform state law, the UCACA could be adopted by federal legisla-
tion or promulgated as a rule by a state or federal agency with appropriate authority.
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on the following question: "What specific, quantifiable benefits to sellers or
telemarketers result from preacquired account telemarketing?"" In its com-
ments accompanying the final rule, the FTC found the response
underwhelming:
[A]lthough business and industry representatives acknowledged
during the Rule Review that the practice of preacquired account
telemarketing was quite common, maintaining that it was "very
important" to them, they provided scant information that would
help to quantify the benefits conferred by this practice or better
explain how these benefits might outweigh the substantial con-
sumer harm it can cause.245
In support of the practice's benefits, the industry first contended that
preacquired marketing protected consumers' private financial data by not ex-
posing actual account numbers to employees of the seller who might steal
the numbers.2 46 The FTC found that, "[t]he record does not reveal any rea-
son to support the notion that the risk of identity theft is any different in
[transactions where a consumer discloses his account information] than in
transactions where the seller has opted to make use of preacquired account
information." 247
The second benefit claimed by the industry is that preacquired market-
ing is more efficient because the seller need not acquire the account number
directly from the consumer. The FTC found this benefit trivial compared to
the problem of consumer misunderstanding created by this marketing prac-
tice. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how preacquired marketing is not much
more expensive overall for the seller. The costs incurred by using the preac-
quired marketing method are much greater than the small cost incurred by
nearly every other seller to obtain the account number from the consumer
before charging her account. The preacquired seller must negotiate a con-
tract with account issuers or other sellers that allow access to consumer ac-
count information, must split the profit of the transactions with these
business partners, and then must make additional disclosures in the solicita-
tion to describe the free trial offer and obtain some evidence of alleged con-
sent to the transaction. All of these costs must be considered in establishing
the price of the service. In any case, the FTC clearly is correct that this
alleged benefit does not remotely justify the strong evidence of consumer
deception with preacquired marketing.
The FTC did find one industry argument sufficiently persuasive to re-
vise its previously proposed outright ban on using preacquired account infor-
244 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 4492, 4538 (proposed Jan. 30, 2002) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
4 5 FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4617 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).246 Id. at 4618.
247 Id.
[Vol. 47
20101 The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Marketing 471
mation during a telemarketing solicitation. It found that there are some
beneficial, even expected, uses of account information in situations where
"the consumer makes the decision to supply the billing information to the
seller, and understands and expects that the information will be retained and
reused for an additional purchase, should the consumer consent to that
purchase. 2 48 The FTC provided the following examples of this situation: (1)
the use of previously provided account numbers with a standing order for
merchandise at a regular interval, such as quarterly orders for contact lenses;
(2) leaving account numbers on file for a later purchase with the same seller,
such as with an airline or Internet travel company; or (3) when the
telemarketer "upsells" another product to the consumer during the same
telephone call, in which case the FTC found that the consumer may expect
"that the telemarketer will have retained, and be able to reuse, the account
information the customer provided only moments ago. '2 49 The benefit in the
first situation seems especially clear because it prevents the burden of a new
sales transaction when both parties want to have a regularly scheduled deliv-
ery of merchandise.
The common thread in these situations is that they are all charges re-
sulting from seller-retained account information, rather than preacquired
marketing.5 0 As detailed above, seller retained account information can be
used in ways that are beneficial to, and within the expectations of, the con-
sumer or it can be used in ways that mimic the deception problems of preac-
quired marketing.25" ' The mixed character of seller retained account
information does not mean that preacquired marketing creates public benefit.
A consumer does not expect a company to which she has not given her
account information to have special access to charging her account. Section
B details this Article's proposed legislation banning preacquired marketing
consistent with this difference.
B. The Scope and Structure of the Prohibition
Requiring that the consumer provide a preacquired seller with the same
account access information as the consumer would be required to provide to
any other seller is the most effective way to remedy the consumer misunder-
standing created by preacquired marketing. The remaining problems with
24
" Id. at 4617.
249 Id. at 4619-20.
250 As to the third situation identified by the FTC, id., the reuse of account information by
a seller in an "upsell" is different from the original seller switching the call to a second seller
pursuant to a preacquired account marketing contract. There is every reason for the consumer
to expect that she will have to provide her account number a second time to a new seller,
whereas during a seller upsell the buyer may not have this expectation since she knows her
account information is already on file.
25 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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use of seller-retained account information should be addressed by prohibit-
ing solicitations with trial offers.
1. Different Sellers Should Not Use Preacquired Account
Information
The core of the proposed legislation, the UCACA, is the prohibition on
preacquired marketing. The principle animating this prohibition is that the
consumer should be in control of who causes charges to her accounts. The
proposed legislation attempts to prevent account issuers or referring sellers
from providing preferential access to consumer accounts in exchange for
consideration to the account issuer or referring seller. 2
a. Referring seller preacquired account marketing.
The proposed UCACA prohibits the use of preacquired account infor-
mation by a seller and prohibits account issuers and referring sellers from
assisting a seller to use such information. 53 The proposed definition of
preacquired account information is "any information that enables a seller to
cause an account charge to be placed against a consumer account without the
account owner providing all account access information for his or her con-
sumer account directly to that seller. 254 Account access information is de-
fined as "the full account number, or other similar information, and any
other information that the account issuer requires for parties other than the
account owner to cause charges to the account owner's consumer ac-
count. 2 55 Read together, these definitions include all cases of referring sell-
ers providing to the preacquired seller the information needed to charge a
consumer's account. Thus, the UCACA prohibits this form of preacquired
marketing by depriving preacquired sellers of the ability to purchase con-
sumer account numbers and related account access information.
b. Account issuer preacquired account marketing.
These definitions should also work to ban preacquired marketing in-
volving agreements with the account issuer. There is a potential circularity
52 Eliminating the sale and use of preacquired account information would not resolve
concerns with consumer deception and misunderstanding resulting from negative options and
free trial offers. See supra Part III.B.3.a-B.3.b. These problems extend beyond sellers using
preacquired account information. The ban on the sale and use of preacquired account informa-
tion would only prevent the consumer problems that occur from the combination of, or layer-
ing of, free trial offers and similar sales tactics with preacquired account marketing. In other
words, preacquired sellers would at least be in the same position as other sellers who use these
sales tactics.
5 App. A (UCACA § 2, subdivs. 1-2).
5 Id. (§ 1, subdiv. 9). This definition also encompasses account charges by preacquired
sellers for automatic renewal of clubs or other merchandise following a preacquired account
charge for the initial period.
5 Id. (§ 1, subdiv. 1).
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problem, however, when the UCACA is applied against an account issuer.
The proposed definition of account access information refers to the informa-
tion needed by third parties to charge the account.216 The problem here is that
the account issuer (e.g., bank) defines what constitutes the information
needed for account access. Accordingly, an account issuer and preacquired
seller could argue that the last four digits of a consumer's credit card, or
hitting the appropriate "I agree" button on the Internet, constitutes "account
access information" or "other similar information" needed to charge a con-
sumer account because the account issuer has defined that information as
sufficient account access information for that seller.
An alternative drafting option to clarify this situation is to restrict the
definition of "account access information" to specific types of data permit-
ted for a consumer to access his or her account, such as requiring the con-
sumer to provide full account numbers. This restriction would do too much;
it would likely prohibit legitimate transactions either currently in use with
consumer accounts or that may develop in the future. The FTC took this
restrictive approach in the TSR, but the scope of that regulation is much
narrower, as it applies only to oral telemarketing transactions and even then
only imposes certain restrictions rather than a ban. The UCACA would apply
to a vastly greater number of transactions.
Another alternative would be to require the same account access infor-
mation for the preacquired seller that is used for all other sellers. This is
implied with the current definition. 257 Reading this restriction too broadly,
however, may prove burdensome for some lesser-known current or future
transactions in which the account issuer has a legitimate reason to offer dif-
ferential account access criteria for various third parties attempting to charge
a consumer account. Also, if the account issuer has only itself and the preac-
quired seller accessing the account, the information required for transaction
confirmation in the preacquired marketing agreement would be the "other
similar information" required for all third parties to access the account, thus
making the account charge permissible. This situation might occur, for ex-
ample, when a mortgage servicer, phone company, other utility or insurer
allows only preacquired sellers and not other third parties to put charges on
its customers' accounts.
The UCACA attempts to resolve the problem by including the follow-
ing additional prohibition:
No account issuer shall accept from a seller authorization to
charge a consumer account as a result of an agreement between a
seller and the account issuer that provides consideration to the ac-
count issuer and permits the seller to cause charges to a consumer
256 id.
257 id.
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account differently than sellers that have not provided similar con-
sideration to the account issuer.25
The account issuer remains free to design differential access criteria to con-
sumer accounts; it just cannot charge for this privilege. This restriction is
consistent with the consumer controlling access to her account. There is no
reason to allow account issuers to profit from allowing easier access to their
customers' accounts.
c. Limiting the scope of regulation.
The proposed legislation contains several restrictions on the scope of
the prohibition. The UCACA defines the type of account information that
account issuers and referring sellers provide to the preacquired seller in a
way that attempts to uniquely identify preacquired marketing while not en-
croaching on transactions in which the consumer provides account access
information that she intends as authorization for a charge. Because the pro-
posed solution is a total prohibition rather than some form of restriction on
its use, the scope provisions comprise much of the drafting problem. There
are three significant restrictions on the scope of the proposed UCACA
prohibition.
First, the prohibition is limited to preacquired sellers that engage in a
marketing program. All of the prohibitions and the key definitions are lim-
ited to a "seller," which is defined as a person who solicits in connection
with a "marketing program. ' 25 9 A marketing program is further defined as
"a plan, program or campaign to induce the purchase of merchandise by
numerous consumers through telemarketing, direct mail marketing, Internet
promotion or similar marketing methods."2 0 This excludes from the scope
of the UCACA isolated transactions between buyers and sellers. If a plumber
and an electrician are both working on a job, the homeowner can still tell the
plumber to put some miscellaneous charge on the bill of the electrician with-
out concern about violating the prohibition in the UCACA. The preacquired
account problem arises only in the context of broad marketing programs.2 6'
Second, the definition of account access information makes clear that
consumers can authorize payments through systems like PayPal by allowing
account access information to occur through a "payment intermediary. 2 62 If
2. Id. (§ 2, subdiv. 3).
29 App. A (UCACA § 1, subdiv. 10).
260 d. (§ 1, subdiv. 7).
261 The seller definition also clarifies that a company cannot make charges using preac-
quired account information obtained from the affiliate, subsidiary, or parent company. Id. (§ 1,
subdiv. 10). Each seller is a different "person." On the other hand, nothing in the UCACA
prevents these companies from sharing information for other purposes permitted by GLBA or
other laws. See supra notes 214-20. This sharing of information would not make the recipient
a "seller" within the meaning of the UCACA unless it used the data to directly obtain consid-
eration from the consumer.
22 App. A (UCACA § 1, subdiv. 8).
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the consumer establishes an account with such an intermediary and registers
account numbers in the intermediary account, consumer authorization of a
seller to access that account is functionally the same as providing the ac-
count numbers to the seller.
Third, the definition of "consumer" in the UCACA is incorporated in
other definitions to effectively limit the scope of the prohibition to purchases
made for "personal, family or household use." This is a familiar phrase in
consumer protection regulation used to demarcate commercial transactions
from consumer transactions.263 There may be payment systems for commer-
cial purchasers for which the restrictions in the UCACA are not appropriate.
The preacquired marketing problem has been a deception problem for aver-
age consumers.26
2. Limits on Use of Seller-retained Account Information
Regulation of the reuse of account access information by sellers re-
quires a more nuanced approach. Sellers clearly have legitimate reasons to
retain and reuse account access information provided to them by consum-
ers.216 Sellers also have clearly abused reuse of such information in a way
that mimics the problem of preacquired marketing.
66
The UCACA only prohibits the use of seller-retained account informa-
tion when the seller uses the retained account information to market a trial
offer with negative option.167 A seller cannot use a trial offer unless it obtains
the account access information from the consumer solely for the purposes of
making charges in connection with the trial offer.2 68 As a practical matter,
this means that information must be obtained twice in an upsell situation.
This burden is warranted by the evidence showing the extraordinary decep-
tive potential of the combination of a trial offer and a seller's failure to ob-
tain account information from the consumer during the solicitation, thereby
circumventing short-hand signals for assent to an account charge. As with
preacquired marketing, there is comfort in knowing that some over-reach as
to the scope of this prohibition is inconsequential because the seller can al-
ways avoid the regulation simply by acquiring the account number again
from the consumer. Or, the seller could try to obtain the consumer's consent
to a purchase without the trial offer.
Section 3 of the UCACA also prohibits account issuers from using con-
trol over account charges to engage in similar trial offer upsells. As with
263 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudi-
cial Foreclosure Act, 53 Durra L.J. 1399, 1449 (2004).
264 One could imagine business fraud and deception with this type of marketing, but the
risks of regulatory overreach seem to outweigh the inclusion of businesses in the protective
scheme.
265 See supra Part II.E.
266 See supra notes 194-96.
267 App. A (UCACA § 3, subdiv. 1).
268 Id.
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seller use of retained account information, to make a charge in connection
with the trial offer, an account issuer is required to obtain the account access
information from the consumer solely for that purpose 26 9
These provisions of the UCACA are important to prevent circumven-
tion of the preacquired marketing prohibition. One example of such circum-
vention would be sellers advertising inexpensive products for the purpose of
acquiring account numbers for use in a free trial offer with negative op-
tion.270 Or, account issuers and referring sellers could bring the same sales
operation in-house. 27' Without a prohibition on this practice involving mar-
keting of trial offers, much of the deception with preacquired marketing will
shift to in-house use of the same practice.
VI. THE INADEQUACY OF LESSER REMEDIES
Policymakers and academics often hesitate, or even recoil, at the notion
that a product or sales practice should be entirely banned other than for
health and safety reasons. 72 Yet, when there is little to no benefit from a
sales practice and a large public harm, the public is better served by a total
prohibition on the practice rather than partial measures.
A less comprehensive remedy will not solve the problem with preac-
quired marketing. Required disclosures have often been the prospective rem-
edy obtained in public enforcement litigation involving preacquired
marketing. The TSR solution, requiring a seller to collect partial account
access information directly from the consumer, is also an alternative to a ban
on preacquired marketing. But neither of these remedies are sufficient to
control the rampant consumer misunderstanding resulting from preacquired
marketing because they do not solve the fundamental problem of shifting
control of account access from the consumer to the seller in a way that facili-
tates sorting of consumers into those unaware of account charges.
A. Disclosures
Better disclosures of preacquired marketing have been mandated in
many public enforcement actions against preacquired sellers, account issu-
269 Id. (§ 3, subdiv. 2).
270 A preacquired account marketing version of this scenario underlay joint FTC and state
attorneys general actions against multiple affiliated marketing companies. See FTC v. Smolev,
No. 01-8922-CIV-ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/
10/triadsmolevorder.pdf.
27 See supra note 233 and accompanying text describing the use of "wholesale" arrange-
ments that purport to circumvent the requirements of the Telemarketing Sales Rule related to
preacquired marketing.
272 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Con-
tracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008); Jonathon Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regu-
lation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MtN'. L. REV. 1620 (2006). But see
Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 289 (2007).
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ers, and referring sellers." In the action against Chase by fifteen state attor-
neys general, for example, one provision of the settlement required that
Chase include certain specific language in its direct mail solicitations.27 4 One
such disclosure required that the seller of the membership club state in the
solicitation that the consumer's failure to cancel a free trial offer would result
in an account charge without the seller of the membership club obtaining the
consumer's account number.
However, disclosures are increasingly viewed with suspicion as a regu-
latory strategy for controlling consumer deception and misunderstanding,
275
and disclosures are especially unlikely to solve the consumer misunderstand-
ing with preacquired marketing for several reasons.276 There are four particu-
lar reasons to be doubtful about the efficacy of any disclosure regime in the
preacquired marketing context.
First, as described above, preacquired marketing shifts consumer focus
in a way uncharacteristic of a typical sales transaction. Preacquired market-
ing removes the attention-focusing effect of requiring consumers to read out
a long account number, an expiration date, and perhaps a CVV code with
credit or debit cards. That makes disclosures even less likely to be effective
because the consumer has reason to be less involved in the details of the
solicitation if she does not believe that her account is being charged. Further,
preacquired sellers have shown a remarkable sophistication in adapting their
solicitation strategies to take advantage of consumer behavior.277
Second, better disclosures likely will not do much to remedy the time
and decision-making bias created by preacquired marketing. A critical part
of the preacquired marketing problem is that some consumers will under-
stand the solicitation at the time it occurs, but will forget about the unusual
terms of the free trial offer combined with the seller's preacquired access to
the consumer's account. 278 Disclosures at the time of solicitation would not
solve this aspect of the problem.
273 See supra Part III.D.
274 See Assurance of Voluntary Compliance at 7-21, In re Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Iowa
Att'y Gen. Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latestnews/re-
leases/dec_2006/Chase%20AVC.pdf (noting that the same settlement was entered in fifteen
states cooperating in the enforcement action).
275 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 121, at 28, 42 (summarizing research on inadequacy of
credit card and mortgage disclosure requirements in affecting consumer behavior). See gener-
ally Geraint Howells, The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information, 32
J.L. & Soc'Y 349 (2005) (describing the limited practical effectiveness of British and European
Union disclosure rules).
276 It is worth noting that state attorneys general have been bringing cases resulting in
court-mandated disclosure for more than a decade, with little success in controlling the overall
problem. See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 7 ("We have developed considerable
expertise in direct mail marketing ... we continually test variations of direct mail solicitations
to drive higher customer response rates.").
278 See supra Part ILI.B.3.b.
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Third, improved disclosures would do little to solve the special
problems created for vulnerable consumers by preacquired marketing. An
eighty-five year old with mental diminishment from a stroke is not -likely to
be helped by better disclosures. As long as she refuses to give out her ac-
count number, failure to notice disclosures is not problematic. Preacquired
marketing, however, allows the circumvention by the seller of the require-
ment of collecting the account number, and thus makes it possible to charge
vulnerable consumers' accounts without regard to the adequacy of
disclosure.
Finally, a disclosure regime would be complex and difficult to enact in
this area. Preacquired marketers solicit across the entire range of direct mar-
keting formats. The complex changes to the TSR meant to resolve preac-
quired marketing problems, including the various disclosure requirements,279
would have to be implemented with the various forms of direct mail, Internet
marketing, and other solicitation methods.280 A disclosure regime with spe-
cific requirements for language and prominence would be hard to implement
across all of these marketing formats. Furthermore, a complicated set of dis-
closure requirements would be much more difficult to enforce than the
clearer bright-line prohibition on the sale of account access information pro-
posed by the UCACA.
B. Partial Account Information Collection
Another possible remedy short of a ban is to adopt the approach of the
TSR and require that consumers provide only the last four digits of their
account numbers2"' or otherwise allow preacquired sellers to obtain from tile
consumer only partial account access information and rely on the allied ac-
count issuer or referring seller for the remainder. As noted above, it is un-
clear to what extent the TSR restriction of requiring the collection of partial
account information has had an impact on preacquired account telemarket-
ing. It does seem likely that some consumers, perhaps even many, will no
doubt refuse to enter even the last four digits of their account number be-
cause it will trigger some concern for them that their account may be
charged. This probably will result in a decrease in the number of consumers
confused by the practice. While that is a good result, it is not a full solution
to the consumer misunderstanding created by preacquired marketing.
The collection of four digits of an account number, rather than the full
number along with an expiration date and CVV code for credit and debit
279 See generally FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (discussing changes to definitional terms, disclosures, and unfair
practice provisions related to preacquired account telemarketing).
280 See, e.g., 2008 Affinion 10-K, supra note 8, at 7 ("Our direct mail operations incorpo-
rate a variety of mailing types, including solo direct mail, detachable inserts, credit card insert,
statement inserts, promotion inserts, and other printed media.").
2' FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(6)(i)(A) (2009).
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cards, will leave many consumers believing that they have not provided
enough information to the soliciting entity to allow it to charge their ac-
counts. This is particularly true because four-digit collection is used as a
short-hand to confirm consumer identity in commerce rather than as confir-
mation of an account charge. As Professor Edelman states about the practice
of collecting four digits of an account number:
[I]t does not address the core deception that yields unrequested
signups. In no other context site can typing just four digits begin a
recurring billing relationship; consumers rightly and reasonably
expect that entering a paid relationship requires typing an entire
card number . . . . To a typical consumer, a request to reenter a
portion of a card number looks more like a verification process
than authorization.2 82
Furthermore, because the consumer will be providing less account access
information than is typically required for consumer authorization for account
access, preacquired sellers could ensconce this limited data collection in dis-
tracting details or context that makes the partial account information appear
unrelated to the consumer's authorization of an account charge.
Another way to look at this issue is to ask why a referring seller or
account issuer would want to have the consumer provide partial, but not
complete, account access information. It is difficult to construct a justifica-
tion for this distinction other than concerns about a decrease in revenue.
Requiring partial account information collection rather than full account col-
lection information serves no valid public policy purpose.
A further concern with partial data collection is that it would not solve
whatever unintended consequence might occur with a ban on selling preac-
quired account information, which is the only reason for accepting a solution
short of a ban. Any problem that arises with a ban that is related to the
burden on sellers or account issuers having to contact consumers to obtain
account information probably would occur by requiring that the consumer
provide partial account information.
The lesser remedies to an outright ban are not effective solutions to the
preacquired marketing problem. The proposed UCACA and its prohibition of
the practice is the only way to protect consumers from the harmful effects of
preacquired marketing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Preacquired marketing works like an invisible hand. Not the sort that
magically aligns buyers and sellers in equilibrium to promote maximum
wealth. Rather, an invisible hand that selectively reaches into the pockets of
282 Aggressive Sales Tactics Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Benjamin Edelman, As-
sistant Professor, Harvard Business School).
480 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 47
those consumers who fall victim to this practice. Preacquired sellers are siza-
ble companies who charge tens of millions of consumer accounts for billions
of dollars in concert with some of the nation's largest financial institutions
and sellers of goods or services. It appears that almost none of the consum-
ers whose accounts are charged are aware of or want thi' service, and the
deceptive effect of this type of marketing falls hardest on those with the least
defenses against marketplace misconduct-people with limited English lan-
guage skill or mental diminishment.
Preacquired account marketing should be banned. That it has not yet
been prohibited in any form is consistent with a pervasive aversion in the
last few decades to government rules that prohibit the use of sales practices
or the sale of products. It is time to revisit, or at least qualify, the basis for
that aversion in the context of this peculiarly unfair and deceptive form of
marketing.
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APPENDIX A
THE UNIFORM CONSUMER ACCOUNT CONTROL ACT
Section 1. Definitions.
Subdivision 1. Account Access Information. "Account access infor-
mation" means the full account number, or other similar information, and
any other information that the account issuer requires for parties other than
the account owner to cause charges to the account owner's consumer ac-
count. Account access information also includes information required by a
payment intermediary to cause charges to a consumer account.
Subdivision 2. Account Issuer. "Account issuer" means the issuer of a
consumer account.
Subdivision 3. Account Owner. "Account owner" means a consumer
who owns or controls a consumer account.
Subdivision 4. Consumer. "Consumer" means a natural person who
purchases or attempts to purchase merchandise for personal, family or
household use.
Subdivision 5. Consumer Account. "Consumer Account" means an
asset, credit or trade account issued to an account owner, including but not
limited to a credit card, debit card, checking, savings, utility, insurance, loan
or other similar account regularly used by consumers.
Subdivision 6. Merchandise. "Merchandise" means any goods or ser-
vices, including but not limited to insurance, membership programs, dis-
counts on future purchases, or intangibles.
Subdivision 7. Marketing Program. "Marketing Program" means a
plan, program or campaign to induce the purchase of merchandise by numer-
ous consumers through telemarketing, direct mail marketing, Internet pro-
motion or similar marketing methods. Marketing program includes a plan,
program or campaign to induce the purchase of merchandise by numerous
consumers in connection with a contact initiated by the consumer, including
solicitations of consumers to purchase additional merchandise following an
initial transaction initiated by the consumer.
Subdivision 8. Payment Intermediary. "Payment Intermediary"
means an account established by an account owner where the account owner
provides full account numbers for one or more of his or her consumer ac-
counts for purposes of facilitating charges to those consumer accounts by
third parties.
Subdivision 9. Preacquired Account Information. "Preacquired Ac-
count Information" means any information that enables a seller to cause an
account charge to be placed against a consumer account without the account
owner providing all account access information for his or her consumer ac-
count directly to that seller.
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Subdivision 10. Seller. "Seller" means any person who obtains consid-
eration from a consumer in exchange for merchandise or the promise to pro-
vide merchandise as part of a transaction conducted in connection with a
marketing program. For purposes of this Act, separate legal entities, includ-
ing an affiliate, parent and subsidiary corporations, are separate sellers.
Subdivision 11. Trial Offer. "Trial Offer" means the offer or sale of
merchandise in which a consumer receives merchandise at no cost or a mini-
mal cost for a specified period, but has the right to take affirmative action to
cancel the obligation to pay for the merchandise during the specified period.
Section 2. Prohibition on Preacquired Account Marketing.
Subdivision 1. No seller may cause an account charge against a con-
sumer account using preacquired account information.
Subdivision 2. No person may knowingly provide material assistance to
a seller for the purpose of using preacquired account information to cause an
account charge against a consumer account.
Subdivision 3. No account issuer shall accept from a seller authoriza-
tion to charge a consumer account as a result of an agreement between a
seller and the account issuer that provides consideration to the account issuer
and permits the seller to cause charges to a consumer account differently
than sellers that have not provided similar consideration to the account
issuer.
Section 3. Requirement to Obtain Account Access Information to
Charge For Merchandise Sold Through Trial Offer.
Subdivision 1. No seller may cause an account charge against a con-
sumer account if the charge is made for merchandise offered or sold by the
seller in connection with a trial offer and the seller did not obtain account
access information from the consumer solely for purposes of charging for
the merchandise offered or sold in connection with the trial offer.
Subdivision 2. No account issuer may cause an account charge against
a consumer account if the charge is made for merchandise offered or sold by
the account issuer in connection with a trial offer and the account issuer did
not obtain account access information from the consumer solely for purposes
of charging for the merchandise offered or sold in connection with the trial
offer.
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APPENDIX B
A08021.81
Saint Paul MR 55104-6949
CHECK ENCLOSED
Dear Valued Customer -
RE: MONEY BACK ON YOURCRDT CARD PURCHASES
On Budget's behalf, we would like to thank you for your past patronage and know
you had a choice of car rental companies. Budget* is always seeking ways to save
you time and money. This is why Budget has chosen Everyday Values' to offer you
this $9.25 and other valuable benefits when you cash the enclosed check to try
this money-saving service with the first month risk-free.
You can start earning 2% back on your credit card new purchases, up to $100.00 each
year. once you cash the enclosed check to try Everyday Values with the first month
risk-free.
Please accept the enclosed check and
use your $9.25 cash for whatever you wish.
NMIMII1
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Get 2% back on you aedit card pochases wima you try EveydayVabaes with the firt teonahdsk-hee. Simplydrage any itean you buy to ur crdi card.
Asan EmdayuVacmetmn, youll edigible rereiv 2% on yer im S w, urchase ie detailed onthe reves side! You can laok fo'vrd
to recelftn a dwec for up to SIllOA each yea you keep youe refund prilegs.
Anid you can Alan collect up to $40CD each year with four seasonal coupons sorth $I0jO) ecd tow.ard pa d gtoweien, Brn any place you chzoose. Plus,
lear a d iounsan die spot at ftraoc at'nnes.l.kebme Sa.ter e ,eade"ne. Plat Hly , Eddie B . gad
mov. Sve p t S5D.0 orthr -eenif you in" ouly ofaf yourllonda y'tts diohrm In additithir save istantly at local favoariace -again
and again - at nea cd neihsood toun thqpsn and spurs event a td thousands of parucipati g pauperttan ippularthlanrs, nns. ad emm
Your safictiou had your relatiusitp am always imopotanui Whean you cas or deposit he enclosed check we will autuonically extteid your memnbership
for anidditiouil evm zafllowyo r Ohiy-&mdaw and bill di $19.Waulfeeatdi ecard y o hhse o nfil withBude for e mberhip inEverydy Values ,.,less{. you cal = -0 -1825 to .1ce during th 't-dary trial 'chd and v,' urhi* You trial. = begins whi yo Tn
materals atnie in four to five weeks. Evetyday Valesc no afiatd with Budg wilulr sonud-yea. in p yatp .the 299.
annual fee. Your membership for each yer thereafter will be billed at the tlen-cand fee amnaticaly billed anmuly to the a= accaunt unless you cal
to canceL We till no have to ask for your ochnat umber or finthe, consent in orer to bill you.
You also have our mney-back gtunuene. If you choose to disnciatio datig the tial period, you win pay otbing and owe ncthag Aaid you can thacoustane
at any time aft that and teeive a refund of the unused porton of the then-autea yeas's fee.
Si&ncerey,
Mical Lohms
Directr, Everyday Values
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